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COMMENT 
THE PROCESS IS THE PROBLEM:  LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM UNITED STATES DRUG SENTENCING REFORM 
Erik S. Siebert * 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States drug sentencing structure is one of the most 
complex, commonly used, and criticized systems in the federal 
courts. From its clear and focused origin, the federal sentencing 
system has morphed into a tangled mass of rules and regulations 
that few grasp and even fewer like. It has been criticized for being 
unfair and racially discriminatory,1 for being overly complex and 
cumbersome,2 and for intruding upon the judicial discretion inhe-
rent in judging.3 It is hard to identify any aspect of the federal 
* Law Clerk, Hon. Henry E. Hudson, United States District Court, Eastern District
of Virginia. J.D., 2009, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2001, Virginia Mili-
tary Institute. A special note of thanks to Professor Corinna Lain, Anne Gray Siebert, and 
Ella Siebert for their support and advice throughout this writing process. 
1. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 1 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 COCAINE REPORT]; Kenneth 
B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War On Drugs” 
Was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 396–400 (2002).  
2. See Matthew Jill, One Small Step: The Past, Present, and Future of the Federal
Sentencing System, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 91, 97 (2008) (criticizing the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines as “immensely complex, narrowly tailored, [and] restrictive”); David Yellen, 
Saving Federal Sentencing Reform After Apprendi, Blakely and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 
163, 178–79 (2005) (noting that critics of the Sentencing Guidelines “focus on the issues of 
complexity, rigidity, procedural and substantive unfairness and severity”). 
3. See Rose Duffy, Comment, The Return of Judicial Discretion, 45 IDAHO L. REV.
223, 228–29 (2008) (criticizing the determinate sentencing system as too strictly limiting 
judges’ abilities to exercise discretion in sentencing).  
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sentencing system that has not met censure from some concerned 
dissident. 
Yet, despite widespread criticisms of the federal sentencing 
system, few commentators have looked to the process of sentenc-
ing reform as an explanation for its failures. Particularly in the 
context of cocaine sentencing, the analysis has tended to take 
place at the end mark, ignoring the compromises and processes 
along the way.4 This is unfortunate, for the players and processes 
themselves provide a veritable gold mine of information, waiting 
to be extracted for a richer understanding of the problem and 
providing our only real chance for recovery. 
This paper serves to fill that gap, using the history, players, 
and processes involved as a means to refocus sentencing reform. 
Part II provides a historical overview of drug sentencing from its 
conception to its current state. Part III looks at drug sentencing 
reforms, identifying the players involved and explaining their di-
verse motivations. Part IV presents lessons learned and proposes 
a moderate set of normative remedies. Relying on a host of self-
interested institutional actors to institute change, reform meas-
ures thus far have managed to bring about a system totally void 
of direction, obscuring arguably the greatest obstacle in the road 
to an effective sentencing system: the process itself. 
II. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES SENTENCING
The history of United States sentencing reform reveals eight 
significant changes, and numerous proposed alterations, since 
1984. Much like a schizophrenic patient, sentencing reform has 
taken on multiple personalities over time and has now been left 
to wander the halls of federal courthouses with no clear focus, 
murmuring about its once clear past. In the discussion below, I 
illustrate this point by tracing the history of sentencing reform 
from its clear conception to its current confused state.  
4. See generally 1997 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (concurring opinion of Mi-
chael S. Gelacak) (analyzing the sentencing structure based on results rather than the 
process it took to determine the sentence); Nunn, supra note 1, at 397 (looking at the re-
sults of the sentencing rather than how those sentences came to be). 
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A.  Pre-Sentencing Guideline Era 
From 1776 until 1984, the United States federal sentencing 
system underwent relatively little reform. Until 1910, federal 
sentencing was largely based on a legislatively prescribed deter-
minate sentencing system with virtually no appellate review.5 
The first major federal sentencing reform occurred in 1910 and 
stemmed from the acceptance of the rehabilitation theory of pu-
nishment.6 Under this sentencing approach, which lasted in fed-
eral law until 1984,7 Congress devised a power-sharing scheme 
based on an indeterminate sentencing structure.8 This scheme 
called for Congress to set the maximum penalties, for judges to 
impose the appropriate sentences from a specific range, and for 
parole officials to determine the length of individual sentences.9 
The length of a sentence rested on the length of time it would 
take a particular individual to reform, as determined by an indi-
vidual judge and a parole board’s assessment.10  
Support for the indeterminate system lasted until the mid-
1970s when a growing public interest in the criminal justice sys-
tem resulted in a wave of criminological research.11 From this re-
search, empiricists claimed that offenders were not getting reha-
bilitated in the prison systems,12 and that discrimination in 
5. See Ilene H. Nagel, Foreword, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 892–93 (1990). In a legislative-
ly prescribed determinate sentencing system, a federal judge’s only discretion in sentenc-
ing is between appropriate ranges, as the period of incarceration for a particular crime is 
already determined by Congress. Id. at 892.  
6. See id. at 893–95. The rehabilitation theory of punishment focuses on crime as a
disease in which punishments are used to reform the criminal. Id. at 893. It was first 
brought to the country’s attention in 1870, causing many states to adopt an indeterminate 
judicially-imposed sentencing system. Id. at 893–94. Congress adopted this approach in 
1910, which existed with popularity until the 1960s. Id. at 894–95.  
7. Id. at 898–99.
8. Id. at 893–95.
9. Id. at 894–95; see also Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819 (creating boards
of parole at each United States penitentiary). 
10. See Nagel, supra note 5, at 894–95; see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983).
11. Nagel, supra note 5, at 895–96 (calling this public interest in the criminal judicial
system “a crime research boom time” (quoting Leslie T. Wilkins, Disparity in Dispositions: 
The Early Ideals and Applications of Guidelines, in SENTENCING REFORM: GUIDANCE OR 
GUIDELINES? 7, 11 (Martin Wasik & Ken Pease eds., 1987))). 
12. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LIPTON, ROBERT MARTINSON & JUDITH WILKS, THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES 88, 
405–14, 518–21 (1975); James Robison & Gerald Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional 
Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67, 80 (1971). 
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sentencing was at intolerable levels.13 The leading voice challeng-
ing the rehabilitation and indeterminate sentencing structures 
was judicial scholar Marvin Frankel. In the 1970s Judge Fran-
kel’s written works and lectures gave credibility to critics of the 
sentencing system and sparked Congress to take a more serious 
look at reforming sentencing approaches.14  
With the theory of rehabilitation losing credibility and new 
disparities in sentencing exposed, Congress considered bold steps 
to reform the sentencing system.15 In 1976, Senator Edward Ken-
nedy proposed a comprehensive bill to establish sentencing guide-
lines,16 with subsequent proposals introduced in the 95th, 96th, 
and 97th Congresses.17 These proposals ultimately culminated in 
the bipartisan introduction of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
13. See LESLIE WILKINS, ET AL., SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY STUDY 1 (1978); Joseph C. Howard, Racial Dis-
crimination in Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE 121, 121–22 (1975); see also William Austin & 
Thomas A. Williams, III, A Survey of Judges’ Responses to Simulated Legal Cases: Re-
search Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306, 306 (1977) (de-
scribing the sentencing disparity for similar offenses and similar offenders as being perva-
sive); Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence 
Disparity and its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 110–11 (1975) (stating that the costs 
of disparity are high and a concern to the criminal justice system as a whole); Andrew 
Hopkins, Is There a Class Bias in Criminal Sentencing?, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 176, 176 (1977) 
(explaining certain factors that might cause judges to discriminate); Ilene H. Nagel & 
John Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court Sanctions, 4 CRIME 
& JUST. 91, 129, 131 (1983) (describing gender discrimination within sentencing); George 
William Baab & William Royal Ferguson, Jr., Comment, Texas Sentencing Practices: A 
Statistical Study, 45 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1967) (describing the disparity and dis-
crimination within criminal sentences in Texas). 
14. See Nagel, supra note 5, at 899 (describing Judge Frankel’s series of key lectures
at the University of Cincinnati Law School that led to a series of sentencing policy work-
shops at Yale Law School); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW 
WITHOUT ORDER (1973). 
15. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516 (1966) (establishing the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws); S. 1, 93d Cong. §§ 1-4A1 to 1-4A5 
(1973) (describing Congress’s proposed sentencing reform within the Criminal Justice Co-
dification, Revision, and Reform Act of 1973); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hear-
ing on S. 1, S. 716, S. 1400, and S. 1401 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 4830–32 (1973) (statement of Sen. 
Roman Hruska, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (describing the actions that need to 
be taken to fix the broken sentencing system of the United States). 
16. S. 2699, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 37,563 (1976). The bill proposed that federal
judges should be guided by uniform goals and purposes during the application of such 
guidelines. Id. at 37,563–64. 
17. See, e.g., Violent Crime and Drug Enforcement Improvement Act of 1982, S. 2572,
97th Cong., 128 CONG. REC. 11,817–24 (1982); Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979, S. 1722, 
96th Cong., 125 CONG. REC. 23,537–45 (1980); Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, S. 1437, 
95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 13,061–69 (1977).  
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1983.18 After this Act was introduced, the Reagan administration 
proposed its own bill in an effort to gain widespread congressional 
support.19 Later in 1983 the Senate Judiciary Committee filed a 
comprehensive report on sentencing reform, which concluded that 
the federal sentencing system “ha[d] failed, and most sentencing 
judges as well as the Parole Commission agree[d] that the reha-
bilitation model is not an appropriate basis for sentencing deci-
sions.”20 This report also specified that “[t]he purpose of the sen-
tencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the 
fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual of-
fender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individua-
lized sentences.”21 With bipartisan support against the indetermi-
nate sentencing system, Congress moved to put these reform 
proposals into practice.22 
B.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
The passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), on 
October 12, 1984, marked the opening shots in a new battle for 
control over sentencing.23 In the SRA, Congress established the 
United States Sentencing Commission as an independent judicial 
agency to promulgate mandatory sentencing guidelines.24 In addi-
tion, the SRA eliminated parole25 and also instructed federal dis-
trict judges to consider a variety of legislatively determined fac-
tors in sentencing.26 Upon taking over the general sentencing 
18. See S. 668, 98th Cong., 129 CONG. REC. 3,797–814 (1983). Co-sponsors of S. 688
included Senators Kennedy, Biden, Thurmond, Laxalt, Baucus, Hatch, Abdnor, Hawkins, 
Leahy, Cohen, D’Amato, Chiles, Glenn, Specter, Huddleston, Lugar, DeConcini, Zorinsky, 
Moynihan, Metzenbaum, Sasser, Simpson, and Stevens. Id. at 3797. 
19. John Riley, Criminal Code Reform Picks Up Steam, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at 1.
See S. 829, 98th Cong. (1983); see also Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S. 829, 
98th Cong., 129 CONG. REC. 5520, 5521–71 (1983). 
20. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40 (1983).
21. Id. at 52.
22. M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely and Booker: The
Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for Juries, 56 S.C. L. REV. 533, 540 
(2005). 
23. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in scattered sections of 18
and 28 U.S.C.). 
24. Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2017–18 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)–(b)(1) (2006)).
25. Id. § 218(a), 98 Stat. at 2027 (repealing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4218).
26. Id. § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 1987, 1989–90 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)).
These sentencing factors include, in part: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characte-
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structure itself, Congress next moved to control specific hot but-
ton issues in criminal law. 
C.  Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
By the mid-1980s, crack cocaine and the violence associated 
with the illegal drug trade became a widespread concern of the 
media and the public.27 With the 1986 election looming and the 
tragic death of basketball star Len Bias fresh in the public’s 
mind,28 Congress rallied for a swift and substantial legislative re-
sponse.29 Various crack-to-cocaine sentencing disparity proposals 
were submitted over a two-month span, ranging from a 20-to-1 
proposal introduced by the Reagan Administration,30 to a 50-to-1 
proposal introduced by House Democrats,31 to a 100-to-1 proposal 
introduced by Senate Democrats.32 Ultimately, the House Demo-
crats’ proposal was enacted as the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
(“1986 ADAA”), which established mandatory minimum sen-
tences for trafficking in crack cocaine and powder cocaine.33 The 
mandatory minimums set by Congress identified two drug weight 
trigger points: (1) 5 grams of crack or 500 grams of powder for a 
five-year mandatory minimum sentence and (2) 50 grams of crack 
or 5000 grams of powder for a ten-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence.34 With the mandatory minimum sentences set forth in the 
1986 ADAA, Congress stepped aside and left the next moves in 
ristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect 
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide 
just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.  
Id. 
27. See Steven L. Chanenson, Booker on Crack: Sentencing’s Latest Gordian Knot, 15
CORNELL  J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 557 (2006). 
28. See generally Examiner Confirms Cocaine Killed Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1986,
at D25; Roy S. Johnson, At Services for Bias, Tributes and Warnings are Offered, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 1986, at B5.  
29. Chanenson, supra note 27, at 557.
30. See S. 2849, 99th Cong. (1986).
31. See H.R. 5484, 99th Cong. (1986).
32. See S. 2878, 99th Cong. (1986).
33. Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to 3207-4 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2006)). 
34. Id. § 1002, 100 Stat. at 3207-2 to 3207-3 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B)
(2006)). 
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fulfilling the other reform promises made by the SRA to the Sen-
tencing Commission. 
D.  Sentencing Guidelines of 1987 
Based on the SRA’s directive to promulgate a system of de-
tailed mandatory sentencing guidelines, the Sentencing Commis-
sion submitted to Congress its original Sentencing Guidelines 
and policy statements on April 13, 1987.35 Addressing drug sen-
tencing levels, the Sentencing Commission used the designated 
drug quantity levels from the 1986 ADAA to impose a 100-to-1 
crack-to-cocaine ratio in the Sentencing Guidelines.36 The Sen-
tencing Commission also used the mandatory minimum sen-
tences from the 1986 ADAA as a baseline to set proportionate 
sentences for the full range of other powder and crack cocaine 
quantities.37 
The Sentencing Commission’s guidelines, which became effec-
tive November 1, 1987, were not initially implemented due to 
constitutional challenges to the SRA.38 According to one study, of 
the nearly 300 challenges to the SRA heard by the district courts 
in 1988, 179 invalidated the guidelines, while 115 sustained the 
constitutionality of the guidelines.39 The basis for these challenges 
centered primarily on perceived violations of the delegation and 
separation of powers doctrines.40 This attack on the Sentencing 
Guidelines in the lower courts culminated in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mistretta v. United States, which upheld the constitu-
tionality of the SRA and the Sentencing Commission. 41  
35. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 1–2 (1987). 
36. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (1987).
37. Id.
38. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morris, Charting the Influences
on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 
1403 (1998). 
39. Id. at 1403 & n.106.
40. See id.
41. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (“The Constitution’s structural protections do not prohi-
bit Congress from delegating to an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the in-
tricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent with such significant statutory 
discretion as is present here.”). 
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E.  Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
By 1988 drug-related violence was still rising as homicides and 
gang violence were increasing at record rates in many major ur-
ban areas.42 In an effort to address areas not specified in the 1986 
ADAA, Congress considered a series of new mandatory penalties 
and strengthened some already in place.43 In the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988 (“1988 ADAA”),44 Congress included a death penalty 
provision for drug-related convictions,45 created a “drug czar” to 
coordinate drug-related crime control measures,46 and expanded 
international drug control efforts.47  
F.  Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
Faced with criticisms and concerns from its broad sentencing 
reform steps,48 Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (“1994 Act”).49 Under the 1994 Act, 
the Sentencing Commission was required to issue a report to 
Congress “on issues relating to sentences applicable to offenses 
involving the possession or distribution of all forms of cocaine.”50 
More specifically, the 1994 Act required the Sentencing Commis-
sion to “address the differences in penalty levels that apply to dif-
ferent forms of cocaine and include any recommendations that 
the Sentencing Commission may have for retention or modifica-
tion of such differences in penalty levels.”51 With the passage of 
this new reporting system, Congress renewed its active role in the 
sentencing process. 
42. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton & John R. Steer, Competing Sen-
tencing Policies in a “War on Drugs” Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 316 (1993). 
43. Id.
44. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
45. Id. tit. VII, 102 Stat. at 4387 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2006)).
46. See id. tit. I, 102 Stat. at 4181 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006)).
47. Id. tit. IV, 102 Stat. at 4261–95 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
21, 22, 31, 41, and 44 U.S.C.). 
48. See 140 CONG. REC. 8121 (1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes); 140 CONG. REC. 8122
(1994) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
49. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
50. Id. tit. XXVIII, § 280006, 108 Stat. at 2097.
51. Id.
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G.  Sentencing Commission Cocaine Reports to Congress 
The 1994 Act’s passage forced the Sentencing Commission to 
issue reports to Congress recommending various sentencing re-
forms.52 Most noticeably, these reports conveyed the findings of 
Sentencing Commission hearings regarding the 100-to-1 crack-to-
cocaine disparity and urged Congress to lower the disparity.53 
However, as discussed below, the reports achieved little practical 
success other than to provide political cover for Congress. 
1. 1995 Report
On February 28, 1995, the Sentencing Commission issued its 
first comprehensive report to Congress recommending changes to 
the current cocaine sentencing scheme, including a reduction in 
the 100-to-1 punishment ratio between crack and powder co-
caine.54 Most importantly, however, the Sentencing Commission 
concluded that “the most efficient and effective way for Congress 
to direct cocaine sentencing policy is through the established 
process of sentencing guidelines, rather than relying solely on a 
statutory distinction between the two forms of the same drug.”55 
Additionally, in 1995 the Sentencing Commission proposed sever-
al amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines.56 Most significantly, 
Amendment Five proposed an elimination of the 100-to-1 ratio in 
sentencing, abandoning the distinction between crack and pow-
dered cocaine.57 Congress later rejected Amendment Five58 but di-
rected the Sentencing Commission to make further recommenda-
tions regarding the crack-to-powder disparity.59 
52. See id.
53. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 195–96 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 COCAINE REPORT]. 
54. Id. at xiv.
55. Id.
56. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed.
Reg. 25,074 (May 10, 1995). 
57. Id. at 25,075 (“Cocaine base, for the purposes of this guideline, means crack [co-
caine].”).  
58. See Pub. L. No. 104-38, § 1, 109 Stat. 334 (1995).
59. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A)–(C), 109 Stat. at 334 (stating that the Sentencing Commission’s
recommendations “shall reflect the following considerations—(A) the sentence imposed for 
trafficking in a quantity of crack cocaine should generally exceed the sentence imposed 
trafficking in a like quantity of powder cocaine; (B) high-level wholesale cocaine traffickers 
. . . should generally receive longer sentences than low-level retail crack traffickers . . . ; 
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2. 1997 Report
The Sentencing Commission’s next report, issued in April 1997, 
reiterated that the 100-to-1 ratio “cannot be justified.”60 The Sen-
tencing Commission recommended lowering the trigger for the 
five-year mandatory minimum sentence for cocaine and raising 
the trigger for crack, creating a 5-to-1 ratio for crack and cocaine 
sentences.61 Based on these findings, Attorney General Janet Re-
no and Drug Czar General Barry McCaffrey recommended a re-
duction in the guideline ratio triggers to 25 grams for crack and 
250 grams for powder cocaine.62 The Clinton administration coun-
tered by publicly proposing a reduction of the ratio to 10-to-1, 
whereby possession of 25 grams of crack and 250 grams of powder 
cocaine would result in the five-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence.63 Despite these various proposals, Congress introduced no 
bill.64 
3. 2002 Report
In May 2002 the Sentencing Commission issued a series of re-
ports, recommending that Congress adopt a three-pronged ap-
proach for revising federal cocaine sentencing policy.65 The Sen-
tencing Commission again recommended a substantial decrease 
in the 100-to-1 ratio, while essentially proposing a 20-to-1 ratio, 
which would be achieved by raising the thresholds for crack and 
[and] (C) if the Government establishes that a [particular powder cocaine trafficker] has 
knowledge that such cocaine will be converted into crack cocaine . . . the [trafficker] should 
be treated at sentencing as though the [trafficker] had trafficked in crack cocaine”).  
60. See 1997 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
61. Id.
62. Letter from Janet Reno and Barry R. McCaffrey: Crack and Powder Cocaine Sen-
tencing Policy in the Federal Criminal Justice System (July 1997), 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 
192, 192 (1998). 
63. See Peter Baker, Clinton Would Cut Disparity in Some Cocaine Sentences, WASH.
POST, July 23, 1997, at A21. 
64. JoinTogether.org, Clinton Regrets Failure to Address Cocaine Sentencing Dispari-
ty During Presidency (Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.jointogether.org/news/headlines/inthe 
news/2008/clinton-regrets-failure-to.html. 
65. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY viii (2002) [hereinafter 2002 COCAINE REPORT].  
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maintaining the thresholds for powder.66 Despite these recom-
mendations, Congress failed to act.67 
H.  Feeney Amendment 
The 2003 Feeney Amendment tightened the appellate standard 
of review for all departures from the Sentencing Guidelines, 68 
and, in particular, called on the Sentencing Commission to reduce 
the incidence of downward departures.69 Specifically, the Feeney 
Amendment required the United States Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) “to take a more aggressive role in policing guidelines 
compliance and resisting downward departures ‘not supported by 
the facts and the law.’”70 With Congress placing the DOJ in the 
position of monitoring individual sentencing decisions, it was only 
a matter of time before the judicial branch reacted. 
I.  Judicial Sentencing Reform 
By the mid-1990s, the judiciary’s acceptance of the status quo 
seemed stable.71 Courts had rejected various constitutional chal-
lenges to the sentencing guidelines, grounded in the Fifth and 
Eighth Amendments, regarding the crack/powder sentencing dis-
parity.72 But over a five-year span, the Supreme Court’s rulings 
on challenges to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guide-
66. Id.
67. See Chanenson, supra note 27, at 564. For example, Senator Sessions introduced a
bill adopting a 20-to-1 ratio, but the bill never made it out of committee. See Drug Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 2001, S. 1874, 107th Cong. (2001). 
68. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, tit. IV, § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 667 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006)). For a history of the Feeney Amendment to 
the PROTECT Act, see Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise 
of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295–97 (2004). 
69. PROTECT Act of 2003, § 401(m), 117 Stat. at 675; see also Carol P. Getty, Twenty
Years of Federal Criminology Sentencing, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 117, 121 (2007) 
(stating that the “[Feeney] [A]mendment required a district’s chief judge to submit a writ-
ten explanation, with supporting documents such as the pre-sentencing report and plea 
agreement, to the Sentencing Commission within 30 days of a judge imposing a lenient 
sentence. Upon request, the Commission must pass along this data to the Justice Depart-
ment and to the judiciary committees of both chambers of Congress.”). 
70. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U.
CIN. L. REV. 749, 789 (2006) (quoting PROTECT Act of 2003, § 401(l)(1), 117 Stat. at 674). 
71. Chanenson, supra note 27, at 565.
72. Id.
878 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:867
lines—based on the Sixth Amendment—would dramatically alter 
the sentencing landscape.73  
1. United States v. Booker
In the landmark 2005 case, United States v. Booker, the Su-
preme Court held that mandatory federal sentencing guidelines 
violated the Constitution, requiring the guidelines to be strictly 
advisory in nature.74 In doing so, the Supreme Court recognized 
Congress’s basic statutory goal of creating a system that dimi-
nishes sentencing disparity.75 Thus, district court judges were di-
rected to use a set of predetermined statutory factors, including 
the Sentencing Guidelines themselves, as their guiding prin-
ciple.76 These factors required judges to “impose a sentence suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purpos-
es set forth” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).77 Having just upset the 
mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to deal directly with the cocaine sen-
tencing laws. 
2. Kimbrough v. United States
Two years after Booker, the Supreme Court in Kimbrough v. 
United States addressed the 100-to-1 crack-to-cocaine disparity by 
extending the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines to the 
crack disparity guidelines.78 This decision gave federal district 
court judges discretion to brand policy decisions embedded in the 
73. Id. The Sixth Amendment challenges to the Sentencing Guidelines questioned
“the jury’s role in determining certain sentencing facts—facts that had previously been 
decided by a judge.” Id. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (holding 
that under a state sentencing guideline system, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not 
the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maxi-
mum he may impose without any additional findings); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 476, 490 (2000) (holding that every fact that increases a defendant’s maximum poten-
tial sentence, other than a fact of a prior conviction, must be admitted by the defendant or 
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 
U.S. 224, 228–35 (1998) (holding that a defendant’s recidivism was not an element of the 
offense that could be determined by a judge at sentencing).  
74. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
75. Id. at 250.
76. Id. at 264; see Chanenson, supra note 27, at 569.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
78. 552 U.S. 85, ___, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007).
2010] DRUG SENTENCING REFORM 879 
Sentencing Guidelines as unreasonable when the result of a sen-
tence conflicted with a list of statutory predetermined factors.79 
However, the Kimbrough Court “strongly suggested that district 
courts do not enjoy the same sentencing discretion where Con-
gress has unequivocally expressed its intent that the Sentencing 
Guidelines incorporate a particular policy choice.”80 Based on this 
decision, the Court ensured that the only truly binding aspect of a 
judge’s sentencing discretion in cocaine cases is the mandatory 
minimum sentence when the drug quantity triggers such a sen-
tence.81 
3. Gall v. United States
In Gall v. United States, decided on the same day as Kim-
brough, the Supreme Court identified abuse of discretion as the 
standard of review for federal criminal sentences.82 It also set 
forth a process for handling criminal sentencing appeals.83 In that 
process, the appellate court first must “ensure that the district 
court committed no significant procedural error,”84 and then must 
consider “the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed 
under an abuse of discretion standard.”85 By requiring district 
courts to follow procedure—meaning that the sentencing decision 
begins with the advisory Sentencing Guidelines or faces rever-
sal—the Gall decision at least creates a uniform starting point.86  
79. See id. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 575.
80. Patrick M. Hamilton, Are the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Dead?, 52 BOSTON BAR 
J. 6, 7 (2008) (citing Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 571). 
81. See Kimbrough,  552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 572.
82. 552 U.S. 38, ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007).
83. Id. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
84. Id. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 597 (defining significant procedural error as “improperly
calculating[ ] the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to con-
sider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing 
to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation 
from the Guidelines range”). 
85. Id. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 597 (stating that in conducting an abuse of discretion re-
view, the court will “take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the ex-
tent of any variance from the Guidelines range. If the sentence is within the Guidelines 
range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonable-
ness. But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a pre-
sumption of unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give 
due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify 
the extent of the variance.” (internal citation omitted)). 
86. See id. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 596; see also Hamilton, supra note 80, at 8 (suggesting
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J.  The Current Landscape  
As a result of the judicial reform over the last few years, dis-
trict courts are left with discretion they have not seen in dec-
ades.87 In addition, the Sentencing Commission in May 2007 is-
sued a report urging Congress to shrink the 100-to-1 crack-to-
powder disparity by requiring the possession of higher amounts of 
crack in order to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence.88 Sup-
plementing this report was a proposed amendment, section 
2D1.1, which asked for a reduction in the applicable sentencing 
ranges for all crack offenses by lowering the base offense score by 
two levels.89 On November 1, 2007 this amendment became law.90  
Taking all these various reforms into account, it would appear 
that the only part of the SRA and the 1986 ADAA left untouched 
is the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for crack and co-
caine offenders.91 As statutory law, these two acts will require fur-
ther congressional action for reform. Absent that or the Supreme 
Court slowing it down, the shelf-life of these mandatory minimum 
statutes is indefinite. 
III. MOTIVATIONS AND PLAYERS
As shown in Part II, the current sentencing process was not 
produced in one fell swoop; rather, it is a product of a number of 
different actors. This Part focuses on the actors and their motiva-
tions for revealing a problem in drug sentencing reform that oth-
er commentators have missed: the power struggles within the 
sentencing reform process. Two different types of power struggles 
have emerged. The first, which I call the struggle over “governing 
power,” concerns the authority to influence the overall sentencing 
that judges who agree with the Sentencing Guidelines will stick closely to the Sentencing 
Guidelines in sentencing, and judges who disagree will impose a different sentence but 
will strictly follow the process). 
87. See Hamilton, supra note 80, at 6–8 (describing the newly found discretion by way
of the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines (Booker), the 100-to-1 crack disparity 
(Kimbrough), and the process-driven appellate review (Gall)).  
88. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 3, 8 (2007).  
89. Id. at 9; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1156 (2007).
90. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 135 (2007).
91. See Michael Usleber, Presumption of Unreasonableness: Crack Sentencing and §
3553(a), 10 BARRY L. REV. 43, 49 n.67 (2008). 
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framework by defining the role and amount of influence for each 
governmental body involved. The second, which I call the struggle 
over “judgment power,” involves each actor’s control over the im-
position of individual sentences. In simpler terms, by governing 
power, I mean the power to distribute authority to sentence, and 
by judgment power, I mean the power to actually sentence. View-
ing sentencing reform as a series of power struggles reveals per-
haps the most enduring, yet least recognized obstacle to serious 
sentencing reform: the process itself. 
A.  Executive Branch 
The Executive Branch has primarily played a supporting role 
in sentencing reform over the last twenty-five years. Originally 
given a prominent place in determining the length of a prisoner’s 
sentence via the United States Parole Commission,92 the SRA 
eliminated parole and the Executive Branch’s primary role in the 
sentencing system.93 With no constitutional jurisdiction and little 
statutory authority to advocate decision-making roles—i.e., go-
verning power94—the Executive Branch has focused its attention 
on gaining greater influence in affecting individual sentences—
i.e., judgment power—by aligning itself with Congress to achieve
its goals.95 
1. Reagan Administration
The election of President Ronald Reagan marked a significant 
shift in crime policies, due largely to his belief that the drug prob-
lem and the larger crime epidemic were caused by “liberal judges 
who are unwilling to get tough with the criminal element in this 
92. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1989).
93. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 218(a), 98 Stat. 1987, 2027 (repealing 18 U.S.C. §§
4201–18).  
94. Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science
of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 243 (2005). 
95. See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 
4181; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650.  
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society.”96 In order to limit the discretion of these “soft” judges, 
the Reagan Administration aligned with Congress to create a de-
terminate sentencing system.97 Through the SRA, the Reagan 
administration was able to wipe out the indeterminate sentencing 
system and replace it with a determinate structure.98 With the 
creation of the Sentencing Commission and the Sentencing 
Guidelines, judicial discretion was constrained and a body com-
prised of members nominated by the President determined ap-
propriate sentencing ranges.99 Reagan’s support for initiatives 
such as the 1986 ADAA and the 1988 ADAA, furthered his goal of 
taking away even more judicial discretion by imposing severe 
mandatory minimum sentences on specific drug crimes.  
In addition, Reagan sharply criticized the belief that “big gov-
ernment” could solve social problems such as crime and shifted 
the blame onto individuals he held “responsible for their own des-
tiny in this land of opportunity.”100 This shifting of responsibility 
for crimes to offenders explains another aspect of Reagan’s sup-
port for the SRA. More importantly, the SRA exemplified the end 
of the rehabilitation era by promulgating individualized factors 
for judges to consider in sentencing.101 As Assistant Attorney 
General Stephen S. Trott stated in reference to the new Sentenc-
ing Guidelines structure, “the particular history and characteris-
tics of the defendant and the particular circumstances of the of-
fense” will be taken into account during the sentencing process.102  
96. Remarks at a Campaign Rally for Senator James T. Broyhill in Raleigh, North
Carolina, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1345, 1348 (Oct. 8, 1986); see Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Se-
verity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 627 
& n.83 (2003) (discussing the shift from “compassion fatigue” to Reagan’s “get tough ap-
proach”). 
97. See generally 149 CONG. REC. 12, 357 (2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was the result of extraordinary bipartisan cooperation. In 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, over a ten-year period, Senator Thurmond, Senator 
Hatch, Senator Biden, and I worked with the Carter and Reagan administrations to strike 
the best balance between the goal of consistent sentencing in Federal law and the need to 
give Federal judges discretion to make the sentence fit the crime in individual cases.”). 
98. See § 212(a), 98 Stat. at 1989-90 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006)).
99. Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2017 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006)).
 100. Miller, supra note 96, at 627–28 n.83 (quoting MARC MAUER, RACE TO 
INCARCERATE 60 (1999)).  
101. See § 212(a), 98 Stat. at 1989–90 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)). 
 102. Federal Sentencing Revision: Hearing on H.R. 2013, H.R. 3128, H.R. 4554, and 
H.R. 4827 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
98th Cong. 802–04 (1984) (statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Unit-
ed States). 
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In response to the rising political tide against drugs, and spe-
cifically crack,103 Reagan’s support for harsher drug penalties 
seemed a direct reaction to his feeling that the country must “go 
beyond efforts aimed at only affecting the supply of drugs; we 
must affect not only supply but demand.”104 The 1986 and 1988 
ADAAs reflect this sentiment in that they impose heavy manda-
tory minimum sentences based on the quantity of drugs involved 
in the offense.105 More importantly, the Sentencing Guidelines 
gave DOJ prosecutors individual discretion in charging multiple 
offenses, charging mandatory sentencing provisions, and proving 
or abstaining from a list of aggravating or mitigating factors.106  
In sum, the Reagan administration saw changes in both go-
verning power and judgment power. Governing power moved 
from the executive to the legislative branch via the SRA. On an 
individual basis, however, judgment power moved back to the ex-
ecutive branch via mandatory sentencing and prosecutorial dis-
cretion.  
2. George H.W. Bush Administration
Continuing his predecessor’s campaign against drugs, Presi-
dent George H.W. Bush named the “War on Drugs” as his top 
domestic policy.107 Subsequently, President Bush’s administration 
is largely viewed in tandem with, or as the main implementer of, 
the Reagan sentencing reforms.108 Bush’s Reaganesque approach 
to the drug problem is evident in his 1992 National Drug Control 
 103. See Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 42, at 315 (stating that opinion polls found that 
drug abuse was the number one public concern). 
 104. Remarks Announcing the Campaign Against Drug Abuse and a Question-and-
Answer Session with Reporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1045, 1046 (Aug. 4, 1986). 
 105. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VI, § 6371, 102 Stat. 
4181, 4370 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006)) (providing increased penal-
ties for certain serious crack possession offenses); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-570, tit. I, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to 3207-4 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006)) (providing increased penalties based on the quantity of drugs 
possessed); see also Wilkins, Jr., et al., supra note 42, at 315 (“By enacting mandatory pe-
nalty provisions, Congress believed serious drug offenders would have no escape from 
lengthy terms of imprisonment.”).  
 106. Bowman, supra note 94, at 247–48. 
 107. See Address to the Nation on the National Drug Control Strategy, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1136, 1136 (Sept. 4, 1989) (“[T]he gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is 
drugs.”). 
108. See Andrew B. Whitford & Jeff Yates, Policy Signals and Executive Governance: 
Presidential Rhetoric in the War on Drugs, 65 J. POL. 995, 998 (2003). 
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Strategy Paper, which stated that “to explain the drug problem 
by pointing to social conditions is to ‘victimize’ drug users. . . . 
The drug problem reflects bad decisions by individuals with free 
wills.”109 
Despite the similarities, President Bush did differ with regard 
to the scope of the drug policies in his push for a national strate-
gy.110 Unlike Reagan, Bush firmly encouraged a big-government 
approach by providing more funding, a larger criminal justice 
system, and more interaction between state and federal govern-
ments.111 Furthermore, Bush exercised influence over his own 
branch’s judgment power by centralizing and monitoring charge 
and pleading decisions within the DOJ.112 In the form of the 
Thornburgh Memorandum, Bush held all federal prosecutors to 
the Sentencing Guidelines’ structure of “real offense” sentenc-
ing113 and prohibited “fact bargaining” over sentencing enhance-
ments.114 These moves reflected Bush’s belief in severe, yet uni-
form, sentences nationwide.115 Here, then, we see George H.W. 
Bush’s administration maintaining Reagan’s policies with regard 
to governing power, but attempting to further expand the Execu-
tive Branch’s judgment power. 
3. Clinton Administration
The election of President Bill Clinton in 1992 marked a suc-
cessful effort to cast Democrats as the party of “law and order.”116 
 109. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: A NATION RESPONDS TO 
DRUG USE 2 (1992). 
 110. See Address to the Nation on the National Drug Control Strategy, supra note 107, 
at 1137 (“To win the war against addictive drugs like crack will take more than just a 
Federal strategy: It will take a national strategy, one that reaches into every school, every 
workplace, involving every family.”). 
111. Id. at 1137–40. 
 112. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of 
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1440 (2008). 
 113. David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 408 (1993) (defining a “‘real offense 
element’ as any sentencing factor not included in the definition of the offense of conviction 
and either established at trial or admitted by the defendant as part of a guilty plea”). 
 114. See 1989 Memorandum from Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to All U.S. 
Attorneys, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 347, 347–49 (1994). 
 115. Stith, supra note 112, at 1441. 
 116. Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How 
the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 
GEO L.J. 1385, 1407 (2006). 
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By placing himself in the center of a major political divide on 
crime, Clinton promised “to ‘restore goverument [sic] as the 
upholder of basic law and order for crime-ravaged communi-
ties.’”117 In an effort to keep a political advantage on issues of 
crime, Clinton endorsed a wide variety of ‘‘tough on crime’’ provi-
sions that placed the federal government in a more active role.118 
In addition, throughout most of his administration, Clinton op-
posed the recommendations made by the Sentencing Commission 
in their reports regarding the 100-to-1 crack-to-cocaine dispari-
ty.119 Even with support for a reduction in the disparity by mem-
bers of his own administration—namely Attorney General Janet 
Reno and Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey—Clinton did not act.120 De-
spite the expectations of many, Clinton’s need to prove his tough-
ness on crime prohibited him from reforming any of the previous 
Republican administration drug sentencing laws.121 In turn, the 
status quo over the struggle for governing and judgment power 
remained. 
4. George W. Bush Administration
President George W. Bush’s policies regarding drug sentencing 
largely concentrated on a continued centralization of judgment 
power and the monitoring of downward departures. President 
Bush’s centralization of judgment power was an outgrowth of his 
administration’s embrace of the unitary power theory.122 Under 
 117. Id. (quoting Democratic Party Platform of 1992, A New Covenant with the Ameri-
can People, July 13, 1992, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 
29610). 
 118. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Interning the “Non-Alien” Other: The Illusory Protections 
of Citizenship, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 200 (2005) (stating these provisions in-
cluded placing an “additional 100,000 police officers on the streets, providing more funding 
for state prisons, adding a ‘three strikes’ mandatory life sentence provision, enhancing 
sentences for ‘gang members’ [and] directing the sentencing commission to increase penal-
ties for offenses committed in newly designated ‘drug free zones’ . . .”). 
 119. See Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 37, 63 (2005); Ann Devroy, Clinton Retains Tough Law on Crack Cocaine: Panel’s 
Call to End Disparity in Drug Sentencing Is Rejected, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1995, at A1. 
 120. See Christopher S. Wren, Reno and Top Drug Official Urge Smaller Gap in Co-
caine Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1997, at A1 (noting, however, that Clinton privately 
signaled support for the recommendations that crack-cocaine sentencing disparities be re-
duced).  
 121. See Julie Stewart, Sentencing in the States: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 39 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 413, 424 (2001). 
 122. Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The 
Center Doesn’t,  117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1382 (2008). 
886 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:867
this theory, which provides that the Constitution grants the Pres-
ident the whole of executive power,123 President Bush justified 
and “subordinat[ed] all prosecutorial decision making to centra-
lized control.”124 This centralization of judgment power is exempli-
fied by Attorney General John Ashcroft’s 2003 memorandum, 
which enjoined all federal prosecutors to “charge and pursue the 
most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are sup-
ported by the facts of the case, except as authorized by an Assis-
tant Attorney General, United States Attorney, or designated su-
pervisory attorney . . . .”125 
President Bush next persuaded Congress to pass the 2003 Fee-
ney Amendment to monitor judicial discretion even further.126 
Under this Act, Congress tasked the Executive Branch and the 
DOJ to monitor individual downward departures from the Sen-
tencing Guidelines,127 adding an additional judgment power to the 
Executive Branch.  
With regard to the crack sentencing disparity, Bush defied all 
expectations when he stated prior to his inauguration that the 
disparity “ought to be addressed by making sure the powder-
cocaine and the crack-cocaine penalties are the same. I don’t be-
lieve we ought to be discriminatory.”128 However, this statement 
later conflicted with Bush administration statements.129 During 
2002 testimony before the Sentencing Commission, Deputy At-
torney General Larry D. Thompson stated that “[t]he current fed-
eral policy and guidelines for sentencing crackcocaine offenses are 
appropriate” and that crack “traffickers should be subject to sig-
nificantly higher penalties than traffickers of like amounts of 
 123. See, e.g., Adam M. Giuliano, Emergency Federalism: Calling on the States in Peril-
ous Times, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341, 354 n.74 (2007). 
 124. Richman, supra note 122, at 1382. 
 125. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to All Federal 
Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516. 
htm. 
126. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children To-
day (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, tit. IV, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667–76 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006)).  
 127. Id. § 401(l), 117 Stat. at 674–75 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 note (2006) (Report 
by Attorney General)).  
 128. Inside Politics (CNN television broadcast Jan. 18, 2001), transcript available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0101/18/ip.01.html. 
 129. Neil A. Lewis, Justice Department Opposes Lower Jail Terms for Crack, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at A24. 
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powder [cocaine].”130 Despite the Bush administration’s stance, 
the Sentencing Commission proposed amending the Sentencing 
Guidelines in 2007 to eliminate the sentencing disparity.131 
Here, then, we see significant changes in the nature of Execu-
tive power with regard to sentencing. With the initial transfer of 
governing power under Reagan from the Executive to Congress, 
subsequent administrations have worked to preserve that shift. 
Conversely, in terms of judgment power, the Executive has moved 
well past its original allotment, further expanding its control over 
individual sentencing.  
B.  Congressional Reform 
Congress has played a pivotal role in the struggle for power in 
drug sentencing reform over the last twenty-five years.132 With 
the governing power to define federal crimes and establish the 
method and degree of punishment, sentencing reform has, until 
recently, been regarded as the exclusive domain of Congress. 
Congress’s decision to become involved in the federal sentencing 
scheme in the 1970s led to the overhaul of the indeterminate sen-
tencing system and proved to be a massive power grab away from 
the judicial branch.133 The principal justification set forth by Con-
gress for this grab centered on the ideological goal of uniformi-
ty.134 But as the opportunity for political gain became clear, both 
parties attempted to take the lead on issues regarding criminal 
enforcement.135  
In dealing specifically with the drug sentencing laws, certain 
members of Congress have played the paradoxical role of taking a 
hardline stance on crack sentencing, yet protesting the effects of 
such an approach.136 Furthermore, both political parties aban-
130. Id. 
 131. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28,558, 28,571–
73 (May 21, 2007).  
132. See Robert Howell, Sentencing Reform Lessons: From the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 to the Feeney Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1071 (2004). 
133. See id. at 1072. 
 134. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 229 (1993). 
135. See id. at 285. 
136. See Randall Kennedy, A Response to Professor Cole’s “Paradox of Race and Crime”, 
83 GEO L.J. 2573, 2574–75 (1995). 
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doned traditional notions of platform ideology in an attempt to 
ensure their place at the forefront of “law and order” legislation.137 
Playing on the public fears of lawlessness, racism, and unequal 
enforcement of the law, members of Congress have reshaped sen-
tencing reform into a political weapon rather than a political ob-
jective. The following topics highlight the varying motivations 
behind congressional actors in their attempt to gain political ad-
vantage.  
1. SRA
As mentioned earlier, the SRA originated from academic criti-
cism of the indeterminate sentencing model which permitted 
judges and parole officials to exercise unguided discretion.138 This 
liberal criticism primarily focused on “unwarranted disparities,” 
including alleged bias against minorities,139 which it claimed was 
inherent in a judicial discretion model.140 Also unhappy with this 
judicial discretion model were critics from the political right, who 
condemned the perceived leniency of the sentencing structure and 
the rehabilitation system.141 With these two sides converging in a 
rejection of the indeterminate system, Senator Edward Kennedy 
saw a great opportunity for Congress to use its governing power 
to achieve a “net gain for civil liberties.”142  
To access the congressional governing power to implement 
reform, Senator Kennedy aligned himself with several  powerful 
 137. See Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and 
Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 412–14 (1995).  
 138. Stith & Koh, supra note 134, at 227–28.  
 139. 130 CONG. REC. 838–39 (1984) (statement of Sen. Joe Biden). Senator Biden, an 
important figure on the liberal side in enacting sentencing reform, stated that “most of the 
people who wind up in jail are people who are poor and people who are black and people 
who are from a minority, and some racists among us will say that is because that is how 
those folks are.” Id. at 839. He went on to note that “studies show the white middle-class 
guy gets a more lenient sentence than the black guy, and you know that is kind of disturb-
ing.” Id. Senator Biden argued that judges were not making impartial decisions because 
they “are not color blind and judges do not leave their baggage at home.” Id. 
140. See Stith & Koh, supra note 134, at 227. 
141. Id. at 227–28 (citing Jonathan D. Casper, Determinate Sentencing and Prison 
Crowding in Illinois, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 236–37 (1984)). 
 142. See Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing on S. 1437 Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 
9056 (1977) (statement of Alan Dershowitz, Professor, Harvard Law School). “Net gain for 
civil liberties” was a phrase coined by Professor Dershowitz, a consultant for Sen. Kennedy 
brought in to analyze a potential change in the indeterminate system. Id. 
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conservative senators, including conservative Democrat Senator 
John L. McClellan and Republican Senator Strom Thurmond.143 
Needing conservative support in the Senate, Senator Kennedy 
repeatedly compromised on a variety of legislation proposals call-
ing for reform of the indeterminate system.144 A complete passage 
of these sentencing reforms, however, was stalled due to the 
House Judiciary Committee’s fundamental belief that “judicial 
discretion in sentencing is a cornerstone of the criminal justice 
system . . . .”145 This stalemate within the legislature continued 
until 1984, when House Republican supporters of the Senate’s 
Comprehensive Crime Control Bill (which included Senator Ken-
nedy’s Sentencing Reform Act) were able to attach the sentencing 
reform legislation to an urgent appropriations bill.146 Due to this 
surprising “parliamentary maneuver,” the SRA was passed by 
both houses of Congress and signed into law.147 
House members’ resistance to these sentencing reform meas-
ures primarily focused on a rejection of the Senate’s underlying 
premise that the unjustified sentencing disparities were a result 
of judicial discretion.148 Opposition leaders in the House blamed 
these sentencing disparities on prosecutorial charging and sen-
tencing practices.149 But for the Senate leaders, a wide lack of con-
fidence in the federal judiciary was the main motivation behind 
their efforts to reform the indeterminate system.150 As one Senate 
staff member stated, “If judges could fix the problem, why haven’t 
they? We’ve known for 12 years we’ve had a problem.”151 In short, 
distrust of the judiciary was the stimulus for the establishment of 
the Sentencing Commission and the strict Sentencing Guideline 
structure.152 
 143. Stith and Koh, supra note 134, at 232, 234.  
144. See id. at 286. 
 145. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1396, at 489 (1980). 
146. Stith & Koh, supra note 134, at 264 (citing Nadine Cohodas, Enactment of Crime 
Package Culmination of 11-Year Effort, 423 CONG. Q. 2752, 2752 (1984)). 
147. Id. at 277. 
148. See id. at 278 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 65 (1984)).  
149. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 34–35 & nn.34–35 (1984)). 
150. See id.  
 151. Nadine Cohodas, Guidelines for Judges: Sentencing Reform Measures Seek to Re-
duce Disparities, 41 CONG. Q. 337, 339 (1983). 
 152. Stith & Koh, supra note 134, at 279–80 (explaining how distrust of the judiciary 
resulted in only three judges receiving appointments to the Sentencing Commission).  
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Due to the bipartisan approach in enacting the SRA, it should 
come as no surprise that both liberal and conservative influences 
on the new distribution of judgment power are present. Starting 
with Senator Kennedy’s early compromises with conservatives,153 
the uniformity brought by the SRA has consistently been paired 
with tougher and harsher sentences in the Sentencing Guide-
lines.154 In addition, with the governing power regarding Sentenc-
ing Commission nominations largely in the hands of Republican 
administrations and a “law and order” Senate,155 the congression-
al intent behind the SRA, addressing “unwarranted disparities” 
and the leniency in sentences, has largely been fulfilled.156 
2. Racial Disparity
The passage of severe cocaine sentencing laws in the form of 
the 1986 and 1988 Anti-Drug Acts marks a “get tough” approach 
by Congress in dealing with drug crimes. Faced with tragic co-
caine related deaths of famous athletes, polls showing drug abuse 
as the number one public concern, and regular reports on the is-
sue by all forms of media, the government’s handling of drugs be-
came a major political issue.157 Understandably vocal on the effect 
of drug abuse on their communities, many inner city leaders 
played an important role in encouraging drug legislation.158 This 
concern for drug abuse took the form of public statements by 
leaders of the African-American community in rallies held 
throughout the country.159 This public outcry made it difficult for 
any politician to resist reform out of fear of being labeled “soft on 
crime.” 
153. See id. at 286. 
154. See id. at 284–86. 
155. See id. at 285. 
156. See id. at 284. 
157. See Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 42, at 315.  
158. See Gary Gately, On City Street Corners, Night of Antidrug Vigils, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 22, 1986, at B1 (describing how leaders of 60 predominantly black churches in New 
York City declared crack and other drugs “a new form of genocide” in an all night vigil). 
159. Actor Ossie Davis stated, “Just as in the past we fought slavery and we fought rac-
ism, we are going to fight drugs and the total indifference of those in power . . . . Unless 
the Federal, state and city governments are willing to put crack, other drugs and their at-
tendant problems at the very top of their agendas, we are going to stay in the streets.” Id. 
at B1, B4. 
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Symbolic of this attitude among black leaders were numerous 
statements by Congressman Charles B. Rangel, a Democratic 
Representative from Harlem.160 Representative Rangel was par-
ticularly critical of the Reagan administration for what he per-
ceived to be a lack of support for the “War on Drugs.”161 Prominent 
Democratic leaders used Representative Rangel’s outspokenness 
on the drug issue as a political opportunity to place white and 
black urban voters on the same side in the war on crime.162 
In addition to Representative Rangel, other political leaders 
argued for Congress to take action in addressing the crack epi-
demic using their judgment power. Faced with pressure from his 
own constituents, Speaker of the House Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, 
Jr., announced a five-week deadline for work on an omnibus anti-
drug bill.163 Speaker O’Neill also called a Democratic leadership 
meeting in the House of Representatives to remind fellow Demo-
crats that drugs would be a major issue in the 1986 mid-term 
elections.164 Assisting in the political effort to rally support for 
drug legislation was the House Democratic Leader Jim Wright, 
who felt the most pressing concern for Congress was to act before 
the media lost interest.165 On the Republican side, House Leader 
Robert H. Michel was largely concerned with the Democrat’s 
grabbing the drug issue and making it their own.166 
 160. See Lena Williams, U.S. Drive on Drugs Urged, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1986, at B9 
(describing the June 25, 1986, press conference of Congressman Charles B. Rangel where 
Rangel used the death of athlete Len Bias to underscore the need for a national drive to 
combat drug abuse).  
 161. Id. (quoting Rep. Rangel, who stated, “Even though the [Reagan] Administration 
claims to have declared a ‘war on drugs,’ the only evidence we find of this war are the ca-
sualties. . . . If indeed a war has been declared, I asked the question when was the last 
time we heard a statement in support of this war from our Commander in Chief.”). 
 162. See Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Tough Talk for Democrats, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 8, 
1989, at 38 (describing a Democratic strategy to gain a political edge in crime by focusing 
on victims rather than criminal rights).  
163. See Sterling, supra note 137, at 408.  
 164. Ran Zev Schijanovich, Note, The Second Circuits’ Attack on Jury Nullification in 
United States v. Thomas: In Disregard of the Law and the Evidence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1275, 1321 n.289 (1999) (citing Frontline: Snitch (PBS television broadcast Jan. 12, 1999)). 
 165. See Peter Kerr, Anatomy of the Drug Issue: How, After Years, It Erupted, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1986, at A1 (quoting Rep. Wright of Texas, who stated that “one of the un-
fortunate by-products of the television age is the short attention span of the American 
public. . . . We walk along fat, dumb, and happy until a crisis grabs us by the throat. Once 
it is off the front burner of nightly television coverage we go back to sleep”). 
166. Id. 
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While the political climate advanced towards a tougher ap-
proach to drug sentencing, it did not take long before the same 
critics who called for the tough legislation began to question the 
effects. After the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines, var-
ious studies exposed the effects of the crack disparity legislation. 
A 1989 study comparing sentences between races found that Afri-
can-Americans averaged seventy-one months incarceration com-
pared with fifty months for whites and forty-eight months for 
Hispanics.167 Additional studies verified this trend, observing that 
between the years 1989 and 1992, not a single white person was 
tried for crack offenses in the federal courts of sixteen states.168 
These revelations served as valuable political ammunition for 
critics of the mandatory minimum drug laws. 
The first influential legislation attempting to eliminate the 
disparity between sentences for powder and crack was the Crack-
Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 1993, introduced by Repre-
sentative Rangel.169 This bill, which made it to the floor of the 
House during debate on the omnibus crime bill in 1994, formed 
the basis of a congressional request for a study by the Sentencing 
Commission.170 Additional attempts at reform measures continued 
into the mid-90s.171 One stimulus for continued reforms was the 
case of Kemba Smith, who became an instant celebrity after re-
ceiving a twenty-four and one-half-year  sentence as a non-violent 
first time drug offender.172 Smith’s conviction resulted from lying 
to federal prosecutors in an attempt to defend her drug-dealing 
boyfriend.173 Championing Smith’s cause were Representatives 
Robert C. Scott and Maxine Waters, who used this single African-
American mother and former college student as an example of the 
 167. Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, Why Did Racial/Ethnic Sentencing 
Differences in Federal District Courts Grow Larger Under the Guidelines?, 6 FED. SENT’G, 
R. 223, 223 (1994).  
 168. Jeffrey Abramson, Making the Law Colorblind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995, at 15. 
169. H.R. 3277, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 170. Carol A. Bergman, The Politics of Federal Sentencing on Cocaine, 10 FED. SENT’G 
R. 196, 197 (1998). 
 171. See Francis X. Clines, After March, House Votes on Emotional Racial Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1995, at B12. 
 172. See Michael P. Williams, ‘Kemba’s Nightmare’: Young Mother Imprisoned Under 
Harsh Drug Laws Fighting for a New Trial, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 28, 1998, at A1. 
173. Id. 
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unfairness in the disparity between crack and cocaine sentenc-
ing.174 
After repeated failed attempts, even under the Democratic 
Clinton administration,175 advocates turned to a 2007 Sentencing 
Commission amendment in an attempt to achieve disparity 
reform.176 This reform measure, although not eliminating the dis-
parity, allowed for a deduction under the Sentencing Guidelines 
point system for crack offenders.177 Emboldened by this latest ef-
fort, Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee, Senator Joseph R. Bi-
den, and Representative Charlie Rangel all introduced bills seek-
ing to eliminate the crack disparity in the 110th Congress.178 None 
made it out of committee.179 Despite widespread criticism, Con-
gress appears to be unwilling to accept the political costs accom-
panying judgment power reform of the crack-to-cocaine sentenc-
ing disparity.  
3. Requiring Sentencing Commission Reports
In direct response to the heavy criticism regarding the crack 
disparity issue, lawmakers were forced to pass legislation to ad-
dress the differences in cocaine penalty levels in the form of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.180 By 
calling for the Sentencing Commission to study the issue and 
174. See id.  
 175. See Steven A. Holmes, Black Lawmakers Criticize Clinton Over Cocaine Sentenc-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1997, at A15 (documenting the Congressional Black Caucus’s 
harsh criticism of the Clinton Administration for not going far enough to convince Con-
gress to cut the disparity between crack and powdered cocaine). 
176. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2007). 
177. Id. § 201.1(c). 
178. See Drug Sentencing Reform and Cocaine Kingpin Trafficking Act of 2007, H.R. 
4545, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Rep. Jackson-Lee); Drug Sentencing Reform and 
Cocaine Kingpin Trafficking Act of 2007, S. 1711, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Sen. 
Biden); Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 2007, H.R. 460, 110th Cong. (2007) (in-
troduced by Rep. Rangel).   
 179. See H.R. 4545, 110th Cong. § 1-5 (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/con 
gress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-4545 (last action was a referral to the Subcommittee on Health on 
Dec. 13, 2007); S. 1711, 110th Cong. § 1-5 (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/con 
gress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1711 (last action was a hearing held on Feb. 12, 2008); H.R. 460, 
110th Cong. § 1-5 (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110- 
460 (last action was introductory remarks on June 6, 2007).  
 180. See Pub. L. No. 103-332, tit. XXVIII, § 280006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097; see Elizabeth 
Tison, Amending the Sentencing Guidelines for Cocaine Offenses: The 100-to-1 Ratio is Not 
as “Cracked” Up as Some Suggest, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 413, 419 (2003). 
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make a report, Congress used a separate non-elected entity to 
continue discussion of the disparity, while individual members 
could remain to appear tough on crime. However, despite years of 
Sentencing Commission recommendations in the form of reports 
and proposals to Congress against the crack disparity, congres-
sional leaders refused to take a firm stand on the issue.181 
C.  Sentencing Commission Reform 
The Sentencing Commission’s position in this power struggle 
has depended on each of the three traditional branches of gov-
ernment. With Congress granting the Sentencing Commission the 
judgment power to study and recommend sentencing reforms, the 
Executive Branch nominating the Sentencing Commission mem-
bers, and the Judicial Branch having a subscribed number of 
seats on the Sentencing Commission, this agency has primarily 
served as a battleground between the branches.182 Yet, because it 
possesses dominant governing power in the form of both ex post 
and ex ante oversight, Congress has always had the ability to pu-
nish and reward the Sentencing Commission based on its policy 
decisions.183 This oversight has left the Sentencing Commission 
susceptible to political pressure from Congress and ensured Con-
gress’s control over the body.184 
1. Makeup of United States Sentencing Commission
Congress’s main objective for the makeup of the Sentencing 
Commission, promulgated in the SRA, was to create a sentencing 
body insulated from political pressure.185 To fulfill this goal, Con-
gress envisioned creating an agency comprised of a group of ex-
perts who would set policy based on knowledge as opposed to poli-
tics.186 Seeing its own limitations in bringing about reform, 
181. See Tison, supra note 180, at 419–28.   
182. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 758 (2005).  
183. See id. at 755. 
184. See id. at 754–57. 
185. See id. at 717–18. 
186. Id. at 717–18 (describing Sen. Kennedy as a leading proponent of the Sentencing 
Commission who argued for an independent body to take the guiding role in sentencing 
reform because it was not “likely that Congress could avoid politicizing the entire sentenc-
ing issue.”). See Edward M. Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law 
With Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353, 380 (1979). 
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Congress attempted to create a commission made of knowledgea-
ble individuals, not dominated by one particular party, who 
served fixed terms and could not be removed but for good cause.187  
Although the push by Congress for an insulated commission 
was spun as an apolitical act by insightful public servants, Con-
gress benefited greatly from the use of its governing power in de-
veloping the Sentencing Commission structure.188 First, in creat-
ing the Sentencing Commission as an independent body that 
would use its expertise to recommend solutions to the legislature, 
Congress could pass the difficult political issue of sentencing to 
the Sentencing Commission but keep up its tough on crime per-
sona with the public.189 Second, Congress could legitimize the sen-
tencing reforms by placing the Sentencing Commission in the 
Judicial Branch by allowing judges to serve as members, while 
giving the perception of cooperation in reform.190 Third, by creat-
ing a guideline-determinate system, Congress took judgment 
power away from individual judges and gave it to a body it per-
ceived as strictly under its control.191 Fourth, Congress’s enact-
ment of the SRA gave the Sentencing Commission clear tasks and 
instructions on its role, which left little room for independent 
maneuvering in actual reform.192  
While under heavy congressional influence, the Sentencing 
Commission’s makeup helps to explain the motivations behind 
drug sentencing reform. The Sentencing Commission is com-
prised of seven commissioners appointed by the president and 
confirmed by the Senate.193 These commissioners serve six-year 
terms and at least three commissioners are judges.194 Also in-
cluded on the Sentencing Commission is an ex officio member, the 
187. See Barkow, supra note 182, at 757. 
188. See id. at 760–62. 
189. See id. at 759, 763–64. 
190. See id. at 759. 
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988); Barkow, supra note 182, at 758–62. 
192. See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sen-
tencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and 
Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 189–93 (1993) (detailing the 
congressional direction to the Sentencing Commission in regards to the Sentencing Guide-
lines and the study of mandatory minimum sentences). 
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 992(a) (2006).  
 194. Id.; Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No., 
110-406, § 16, 122 Stat. 4291, 4295 (to be codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991).  
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Attorney General, who has no voting power.195 The chair of the 
Sentencing Commission presides over meetings and directs 
funds.196  
Since its inception, the Sentencing Commission has had thir-
teen judges serve as commissioners, while every chairperson has 
come from the Judicial Branch.197 In addition, the only other pro-
fessionals who have served on the Sentencing Commission are six 
attorneys, six law professors, and one Parole Commission mem-
ber.198 This heavy slant towards legal professionals has hardly 
created a balanced group of experts.199 Blinded by institutional 
preference and lacking skills outside the purview of law, these 
experts bring nothing more than redundancy. More importantly, 
when judges serve on the Sentencing Commission, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that they would oppose any efforts to strip 
power away from judges.200  
2. Various United States Sentencing Commission Reports and
Proposals
The judicial membership’s influence on the Sentencing Com-
mission has manifested itself in numerous reports and proposals 
to Congress. Besides the strict limits set by Congress in the crea-
tion of the guideline system itself,201 the reports and proposals 
submitted by the Sentencing Commission have been unanimously 
against mandatory statutory penalties.202 The creation of the Sen-
195. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006). 
196. 28 U.S.C. § 993 (2006). 
197. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, About the Commissioners, June 2009, http://www.ussc. 
gov/general/commbios99.htm [hereinafter Current Commissioners] (biographies of current 
commissioners); U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Former Commissioners of the United States 
Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/general/Oldcomms.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 
2009) [hereinafter Former Commissioners]. Of the twenty-six people who have served on 
the Sentencing Commission, the following have served or are serving as the chair: Judge 
Diana Murphy, Judge Richard Conaboy, Judge William Wilkins, Jr., and Judge Ricardo 
Hinojosa. Current Commissioners, supra; Former Commissioners, supra.  
 198. Current Commissioners, supra note 197; Former Commissioners, supra note 197. 
 199. Barkow, supra note 182, at 763. 
200. Id. at 759. 
 201. Hatch, supra note 192, at 189–90, 192–93 (detailing the congressional direction to 
the Sentencing Commission with regard to the Sentencing Guidelines and the study of 
mandatory minimum sentences). See generally Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The 
Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19 (2003). 
 202. Chanenson, supra note 27, at 563. 
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tencing Guidelines is an exception to this trend because, at the 
time, the Sentencing Commission was a new organization which 
wanted to earn Congress’s trust in accommodating statutory pe-
nalties.203 The Sentencing Commission reasoned that not taking 
this initial step in earning Congress’s trust would lead to more 
mandatory minimums and further diminish their judgment pow-
er in sentencing reform.204 
After implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines, the Sen-
tencing Commission began to realize the effect of the mandatory 
minimum sentences on judicial discretion.205 Largely using the 
crack-to-cocaine disparity problem as an example of the ineffi-
ciency of the mandatory minimum system, the Sentencing Com-
mission has consistently opposed the 100-to-1 ratio.206 Focusing on 
such a politically and racially charged issue, the Sentencing 
Commission has attempted to attack the mandatory minimum 
sentencing structure as a whole. As early as 1991, the Sentencing 
Commission issued a Special Report to Congress concluding that 
there are numerous alternatives to a mandatory minimum sen-
tence system.207  
3. United States Sentencing Guideline § 2D1.1
Since Congress’s rejection of the 1995 amendment proposal ad-
dressing the crack disparity problem, the Sentencing Commission 
has been reluctant to issue further amendments.208 However, with 
the de-emphasis of crime as a national political issue and the 
sweeping effect of Booker,209 the Sentencing Commission proposed 
an amendment to United States Sentencing Guideline section 
2D1.1 in 2007, which was enacted and served to lower the sen-
tencing ranges for all crack offenses.210 This first step in address-
ing the crack disparity issue allows individual judges to reduce a 
 203. Id. at 559 & n.41 (citing Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 201, at 35 n.68). 
 204. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 201, at 35 n.68. 
 205. Chanenson, supra note 27, at 559. 
206. Id. at 563–64. 
207. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 124 (1991). 
208. See Chanenson, supra note 27, at 564.  
 209. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
210. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2007). 
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crack offender’s base Guideline level.211 Although not as broad as 
the Sentencing Commission has recommended in the past,212 this 
marked the first instance of successful reformation of the crack-
to-cocaine disparity issue.  
D.  Special Interest Reform 
Of the many special interest groups lobbying Congress and the 
Sentencing Commission, the same general techniques have been 
relied upon to achieve sentencing reform. Lacking any formal 
power, these various special interest groups have relied on infor-
mal governing power to attempt to reform the sentencing sys-
tem.213 This informal governing power has proved successful in 
changing the political landscape regarding tough crime measures, 
but has largely failed in specific attempts to lobby influential gov-
ernment power brokers.214 Using the media, extraordinary cases, 
public testimony, and education; special interest group successes 
have come when they focus on influencing the public, not politi-
cians.  
1. Families Against Mandatory Minimums
The greatest obstacle in the post-SRA phase of sentencing 
reform has been the reluctance by Congress to buck the “tough on 
crime” culture in America. Perhaps the largest symbol of this po-
litical trend has been the mandatory minimum sentences that 
took effect through the enactment of the 1986 and 1988 ADAA.215 
Unhappy with the results of these new severe drug laws because 
of her own brother’s incarceration, Julie Stewart started the Fam-
ilies Against Mandatory Minimums (“FAMM”) in 1991.216 The 
 211. Steven L. Chanenson & Douglas A. Berman, Federal Cocaine Sentencing in Tran-
sition, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 291, 291 n.15 (2007). 
 212. 2002 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 65, at viii, 103–11; 1997 COCAINE REPORT, su-
pra note 1, at 2; 1995 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 53, at xiv, 198. 
 213. Cf. Barkow, supra note 182, at 724–28 (describing how and why interest groups 
for sentencing reform do not have the same lobbying power as interest groups for other 
more traditional regulatory issues).  
214. See infra notes 235–36 and accompanying text. 
 215. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181; Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. 
216. Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Julie Stewart Bio, http://www.famm.org/ 
PressRoom/SpeakersBureauList/JulieStewartBio.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). Julie 
Stewart’s brother, “a nonviolent, first-time drug offender, was sentenced to five years in a 
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purpose of FAMM is to “shine a light on the human face of sen-
tencing, advocate for state and federal sentencing reform, and 
mobilize thousands of individuals and families whose lives are 
adversely affected by unjust sentences.”217  
A large part of FAMM’s influence in the sentencing debate has 
come from its media publication and exposure. In 2009 alone, 
FAMM made the news over seventy-five times in the form of edi-
torials or quotes in many major newspapers, including The Wash-
ington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and 
The Los Angeles Times.218 In addition, FAMM operates a website 
that posts all the news coverage regarding mandatory minimum 
sentences throughout the country, provides resources to families 
of incarcerated individuals, produces newsletters and brochures 
on the federal sentencing laws, and tracks sentencing reform bills 
in Congress.219 These numerous efforts at publicity are a direct 
campaign by FAMM to educate and transform the landscape of 
sentencing reform in America.220 
Although the results of FAMM’s influence on the public are dif-
ficult to measure, it is quite clear that until recently their effect 
on Congress has been minimal. With no change in the mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws by Congress, except in the recent 
crack-to-cocaine disparity amendment, Congress has largely 
voted to uphold the mandatory minimum sentence structure. De-
spite these setbacks, FAMM President Julie Stewart continues to 
insist that “Republicans and Democrats support change and that 
should encourage members of Congress to reach across the aisle 
next year and work together to reform mandatory minimums.”221 
federal prison for growing marijuana.” Id. 
 217. Families Against Mandatory Minimums, About FAMM, http://www.famm.org/Ab 
outFAMM.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). 
 218. See Families Against Mandatory Minimums, FAMM in the News, http://www. 
famm.org/Newsandinformation/FAMMintheNews.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).  
 219. See Families Against Mandatory Minimums, http://www.famm.org (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2009). 
 220. See, e.g., Families Against Mandatory Minimums, New Poll: Americans Oppose 
Mandatory Minimums, Will Vote for Candidates Who Feel the Same (Sept. 24, 2008), 
available at http://www.famm.org/Newsandinformation/PressReleases/CorrectingCourse 
reportandpollrelease.aspx (citing a 2008 FAMM poll showing that nearly 60% of Ameri-
cans oppose mandatory minimums for first time offenders, 78% of Americans “agree that 
courts—not Congress—should determine an individual’s prison sentence,” and 57% of 
Americans said “they would likely vote for a candidate for Congress who would eliminate 
all mandatory minimums for nonviolent crimes”).  
 221. Id. 
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However, this support for change has yet to manifest itself in ac-
tual legislation. On a more realistic level, it seems that, without 
noticeable public support, Congress will continue to lack the polit-
ical courage to make the suggested reforms. 
2. National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Another special interest group which has lobbied hard for sen-
tencing reform is the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (“NACDL”).222 This group of criminal defense attorneys 
has a heavy stake in sentencing reform due to the impact reform 
has on their clients and their own professional objectives.223 
Founded in 1958, NACDL consists of more than 12,800 direct 
members and another 35,000 affiliated members in 94 state and 
local organizations.224 NACDL is important to the sentencing 
reform power struggle because unlike other special interest 
groups, it takes an active part in the actual criminal justice sys-
tem, giving it an indirect judgment power. As a nationally recog-
nized entity,  NACDL uses its judgment power in the court sys-
tem to pressure both Congress and the Sentencing Commission 
on issues relating to governing power. Organized at the local, 
state, and national levels, NACDL’s reach extends beyond publi-
cations and newspaper articles.225 The organization’s grassroots 
support has given it greater sway with judges, legislators, and at-
torneys.226 Indicative of this group’s influence is the fact that “in 
every major case in which the Supreme Court and the appellate 
courts have been asked to rule on government overreaching, 
 222. See Nat’l Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Chronology of NACDL Letters and Mem-
ber Testimony, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/freeform/Testimony?OpenDocument (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2009) (listing at least twenty-one instances of member testimony and 
statements in front of Congress regarding sentencing reform or drug crime laws spanning 
from 1995 to 2008). 
 223. See Nat’l Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Bylaws, Article II: Missions and Purposes, 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/FreeForm/ByLaws?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 18, 
2009) (stating the NACDL objectives and purposes are to promote criminal defense law, 
disseminate techniques that support the field of criminal advocacy, sponsor meetings of 
the criminal bar, represent the Association before governmental bodies, preserve, protect 
and defend the adversary system of justice). 
 224. See Nat’l Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Who We Are, http://www.nacdl.org/pub 
lic.nsf/freeform/WhoWeAre?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). 
225. See id. 
 226. Norman L. Reimer, Inside NACDL, 31 CHAMPION 43, 44 (2007) (remarks of Nor-
man Reimer, executive director of NACDL, delivered in receipt of the Robert Louis Cohen 
Award). 
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NACDL has been there with an amicus brief.”227 This “amicus ef-
fect” not only influences judicial decisions, it also provides the 
courts with an outside ally in their own efforts at sentencing 
reform.228 Additionally, NACDL uses the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s own testimony to attempt to persuade them regarding vari-
ous issues.229 Using the popular target of crack-to-cocaine dispari-
ties to urge for a broader reform of the Sentencing Guideline 
structure, NACDL supplements this testimony with press releas-
es, both praising the Sentencing Commission for actions which 
the NACDL supports and pushing for more reform.230  
3. Cato Institute
Perhaps the greatest example of the varying motivations be-
hind special interest groups in the sentencing reform debate is 
the involvement of the Cato Institute. This right-leaning, liberta-
rian public policy organization, which was founded in 1977 to “in-
crease the understanding of public policies based on the prin-
ciples of limited government, free markets, individual liberty, and 
peace,” has fit well into the sentencing reform movement.231 De-
spite using the same techniques employed by other special inter-
est groups, Cato’s role is unique in the motivations lying behind 
its involvement.  
One such area that differentiates Cato from the other groups is 
in its fields of study. In particular, Cato has taken the unique ap-
 227. Id. In 2009 NACDL has submitted twenty-five amicus briefs. See Nat’l Assoc. of 
Crim. Def. Lawyers, Recent Amicus Briefs, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/newsissues/ 
Amicus?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). 
228. See id. 
 229. Carmen D. Hernandez, Nat’l Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Written Statement to 
United States Sentencing Commission (Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
hearings/11_15_06/Hernandez-NACDL-testimony.pdf (“I urge you to do the right thing. 
Propose long-overdue changes to the crack guidelines that are supported by every one of 
Commission’s reports and that are required by the statutory mandate—in 28 U.S.C. § 
991—to establish sentencing guidelines that provide certainty and fairness while avoiding 
unwarranted sentencing disparities and that reflect empirical knowledge of human beha-
vior.”); see Carmen D. Hernandez, Nat’l Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Testimony before 
United States Sentencing Commission (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/ 
11_16_04/hernandez.pdf. 
230. See, e.g., News Release, Nat’l Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers, “Crack” Guideline 
Long Overdue, Criminal Lawyers Say (Apr. 28, 2007), available at http://www.nacdl. 
org/public.nsf/Newsreleases/2007mn012?OpenDocument. 
 231. See Cato Institute, About Cato, http://www.cato.org/about.php (last visited Dec. 
18, 2009). 
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proach of focusing on the effects of the current sentencing policy 
as applied to the prison system.232 Reporting widespread prison 
overcrowding due to the mandatory minimum sentences, Cato 
has concluded that imprisonment of drug offenders has taken 
precedence over violent crime offenders, who are the real threat 
to public safety.233 Cato insists that although the imprisonment of 
a violent crime offender incapacitates that individual from doing 
more harm, the structure of drug organizations allows another 
member to simply step into the place of the imprisoned drug 
dealer.234 Because of this, Cato has supported alternative methods 
to imprisonment such as supervised probation or parole, electron-
ic monitoring, and boot camp systems.235 
Another area in which Cato has advocated sentencing reform is 
in questioning the constitutionality of the federal guidelines sys-
tem.236 A 2004 book published by Cato argues that “[t]he first and 
arguably dispositive problem is the delegation of lawmaking au-
thority—specifically, the power to set punishment—from Con-
gress to the commission,” which results in the “dubious constitu-
tionality” of the guidelines system.237 These constitutional 
challenges by Cato seem a direct attempt to create “a new, vi-
brant, broad-based alliance firmly grounded in constitutional 
principles and shared goals.”238  
E.  Judicial Reform 
The last twenty-five years of sentencing reform represent a 
dramatic seizure of judgment power away from the Judicial 
Branch, followed by their resilient effort to recoup that power. In 
possession of the governing power of judicial review, the Judicial 
 232. See David B. Kopel, Prison Blues: How America’s Foolish Sentencing Policies En-
danger Public Safety, Cato Policy Analysis No. 208 (May 17, 1994), available at http:// 
www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-208.html. 
233. Id. 
234. See id. 
235. See id. 
 236. See Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing, in GO 
DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING 119 (Gene Healy ed., 
2004). 
 237. Id. at 124. 
 238. See Malcolm C. Young, Special Interests, Principles, and Sentencing Reform in 
America, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1509, 1531 (2006) (reviewing GO DIRECTLY TO 
JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING, supra note 236). 
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Branch has at times hesitantly waged a battle with Congress for 
reclamation of their place in the sentencing world.239 With varying 
degrees of ideology in the judiciary,240 a group of judges has 
aligned itself with other reformers to reclaim control over sen-
tencing power.241 Using both Supreme Court case law, which the 
judiciary must passively wait to reach the highest court, and pub-
lic testimony, which is only as good as the impact it imposes on 
the lawmaker, it has taken years for judicial influence on sen-
tencing reform to evolve. But in one fell swoop, the Supreme 
Court, in the landmark case United States v. Booker, fundamen-
tally reconfigured the sentencing landscape by reestablishing 
judicial control in sentencing.242 Despite these recent gains in sen-
tencing power, it remains to be seen whether the Judicial 
Branch’s governing power is formidable enough to gain back all of 
the judgment power it once possessed. 
1. Case Law
As the highest and most powerful court, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has used its authority of judicial review to rec-
laim a portion of the Judicial Branch’s sentencing power. The 
primary vehicle behind the Court’s recouping of this power has 
been the expansion of the procedural rights of criminals as ap-
plied to sentencing.243 One indication that these rights are merely 
a path to reclaim sentencing power is that earlier precedent had 
consistently deferred directly to Congress or the Sentencing 
Commission with regard to governing power issues with sentenc-
 239. See generally Michael Tonry, Judges and Sentencing Policy—The American Expe-
rience, in SENTENCING, JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND TRAINING 137, 137 (C. Munro & M. Wa-
sik eds., 1992) (discussing the problems that arise as a result of the opposing views held by 
policymakers and judges). 
 240. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: 
Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 742 (2008) 
(“There is considerable literature linking political ideology to decision outcomes”). 
 241. See Marcia G. Shein, Race and Crack Cocaine Offenses: Correcting a Troubling 
Injustice Post-Booker, 31 CHAMPION 18, 18, 21 (2007) (discussing the judicial resistance to 
imposing the 100-to-1 disparity); see also Cracked Justice—Addressing the Unfairness In 
Cocaine Sentencing, Hearing Before the Subcom. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Se-
curity of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 27 (2008) [hereinafter Cracked Jus-
tice Hearing] (written statement of Judge Reggie B. Walton) (stating that the U.S. Judicial 
Conferences have a “longstanding opposition to mandatory minimum penalties”). 
242. 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). 
 243. Stith, supra note 112, at 1473. 
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ing.244 In addition, the Court held in four cases that the guidelines 
regime did not violate a defendant’s constitutional procedural 
rights.245 
Yet in the 1990s, with the same members on the Court, consti-
tutional procedural problems “suddenly” appeared within the 
Court’s application of the guidelines system.246 Over the course of 
six years, the Supreme Court’s view of the Sentencing Guidelines 
shifted as it held that a legislature or delegate agency cannot ig-
nore constitutional guarantees by transferring a part of the pros-
ecution to the post-conviction sentencing phase.247 The culmina-
tion of these cases came in the landmark decision of Booker, 
which declared the mandatory nature of the guidelines system 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.248 
In Booker, the Court relied on the argument that judicial fact-
finding judgment power was too great in the post-conviction 
phase.249 In Justice Stevens’s majority opinion holding that the 
Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment, he claimed 
that the development of the Sentencing Guidelines and legislative 
regulation system “increase[d] the [sentencing] judge’s power and 
diminish[ed] that of the jury.”250 Although Justice Stevens’s ar-
gument may hold true in post-conviction judicial factfinding situ-
ations, it seems insincere to describe the post-SRA reform period 
as a time where the judiciary’s judgment power was increased. 
 244. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371, 374, 390 (1989) (upholding the 
delegation of power to the Sentencing Commission to create “Guideline crimes” and reject-
ing the claim that this power was inappropriate for an agency in the judicial branch of the 
government); see also Stith, supra note 112, at 1474. 
 245. Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 514 (1998) (requiring the punishment to 
be based on relevant conduct of which the defendant was not convicted); United States v. 
Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156–57 (1997) (requiring enhancement of punishment on the basis of 
conduct of which the jury had acquitted the defendant); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 
389, 406 (1995) (allowing double punishment of behavior that both is the basis for a Sen-
tencing Guidelines enhancement and is separately prosecuted); United States v. Dunni-
gan, 507 U.S. 87, 98 (1993) (enhancing punishment on the basis of criminal behavior of 
which the defendant was not convicted); see also Stith, supra note 112, at 1475.  
246. See Stith, supra note 112, at 1476. 
 247. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304–05 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251–52 (1999); see also 
Stith, supra note 112, at 1477.  
248. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005); see also Stith, supra note 112, 
at 1477. 
249. Booker, 543 U.S. at 236. 
250. Id.  
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Furthermore, the outcome of Booker was to give more judgment 
power to judges for all aspects of sentencing by recreating the 
guideline system as merely advisory.251 
In fairness to Justice Stevens, it was the majority opinion of 
Justice Breyer that made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory.252 
In this part opinion, the Court accepted the interpretation by Jus-
tice Stevens253 and took the dramatic step of creating a remedy to 
the Sixth Amendment violation in the Sentencing Guidelines.254 
Relying on legislative intent, Justice Breyer’s opinion severed the 
mandatory nature of the guideline system because a “legislatively 
unforeseen constitutional problem requires modification of a sta-
tutory provision as applied in a significant number of in-
stances.”255 But lurking behind this remedy is the dramatic effect 
of increasing judicial discretion to counterbalance the Sentencing 
Commission and Congress. As Justice Scalia lamented in his dis-
sent, “The majority’s remedial choice is thus wonderfully ironic: 
In order to rescue from nullification a statutory scheme designed 
to eliminate discretionary sentencing, it discards the provisions 
that eliminate discretionary sentencing.”256  
Aside from the effects of Booker, the most interesting aspect of 
the case lies in the power struggle within the Court itself. With 
justices taking sides based on their views concerning judicial dis-
cretion in sentencing, the Booker decision resulted in a fractured 
Court that disagreed as to the proper application of the Judicial 
Branch’s governing power. On one side was the centrist Breyer 
majority—Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Ginsburg—which maintained that the mandatory 
 251. See Anne Marie Tracey & Paul Fiorelli, Throwing the Book[er] at Congress: The 
Constitutionality and Prognosis of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Congressional 
Control in Light of United States v. Booker, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1199, 1226 (2005). 
252. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244–45. 
 253. Justices Breyer, O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Rehnquist ac-
cept Stevens’s opinion regarding the unconstitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines for 
the remedy aspect of their part majority opinion solely because it is the majority opinion. 
Id. at 245. But in a later part dissent, minus Justice Ginsburg, they argue against the con-
stitutional analysis, stating, “I find nothing in the Sixth Amendment that forbids a sen-
tencing judge to determine (as judges at sentencing have traditionally determined) the 
manner or way in which the offender carried out the crime of which he was convicted.” Id. 
at 326 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part). 
254. Id. at 254, 265 (majority opinion). 
255. Id. at 247.  
256. Id. at 304 (Scalia, J. dissenting in part). 
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nature of the Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutional.257 On 
the other side was a bloc of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Scalia 
who dissented in part, arguing that the Court did not have the 
governing power to repeal statutory provisions on Congress’s be-
half.258  
As seen in the makeup of the Booker voting blocs, traditional 
ideology was not the decisive factor.259 The Breyer majority 
seemed to undercut the notion that judicial power was ever taken 
away by Congress, but rather it was placed within a broad system 
of ranges.260 If viewed in this way, Booker is purely a case which 
re-affirms the judgment power of judges in a broadly determinate 
sentencing system. However, this contrasts sharply with the Ste-
vens dissenting bloc, who described the SRA and guideline reform 
movement as a “comprehensive overhaul” by Congress intended 
to eliminate sentencing disparity.261 Acknowledging Congress’s 
pre-SRA skepticism in regard to the Court’s judgment power in 
preventing disparities, the Stevens dissent seems to accept the 
supremacy of the governing power of Congress.262 Fortunately for 
judicial partisans, the triumphant Breyer bloc further streng-
thened the power of the courts in the sentencing struggle. 
Due to the fractured opinion of the Supreme Court in Booker, 
courts of appeals remained reluctant to allow lower courts to use 
this new found discretion.263 In a series of cases following Booker, 
the courts of appeals rejected numerous sentences as unreasona-
ble because they did not believe the mitigating circumstances 
were enough to deviate from the guideline ranges.264 However, the 
dual cases of Gall v. United States and Kimbrough v. United 
257. Id. at 245 (majority opinion). 
258. Id. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
259. See Christopher E. Smith, Michael McCall, & Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice 
and the 2004-2005 United States Supreme Court Term, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 951, 959–60 & 
tbl. 3 (2006). 
260. Booker, 543 U.S. at 251–52.  
261. Id. at 292 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
262. See id. at 291–302.  
263. Alan Ellis & James H. Feldman, Jr., Supreme Court Finally Fulfills Promise of 
Booker, 23 CRIM. JUST. 47, 47 (2008). 
 264. See United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mo-
reland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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States fulfilled the legacy of Booker to allow judges to use the full 
range of their judgment power.265 
In Gall, the Court “reject[ed] an appellate rule that requires 
‘extraordinary’ circumstances to justify a sentence outside the 
Guidelines range” along with “the use of a rigid mathematical 
formula . . . as the standard for determining the strength of the 
justifications required for a specific sentence.”266 These invalida-
tions of appellate review approaches remind appellate courts that 
even though the Sentencing Guidelines are a starting point, dis-
trict courts must consider all of the other factors listed in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).267 Also, after considering all of these § 3553(a) 
factors, the appellate courts are required to review the sentence 
under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.268 The effect of 
such a review process is to ensure that as long as a district court 
provides rational reasons for a sentence, the sentence will likely 
survive appeal.269 
Alongside Gall in representing the promises of Booker is the 
case of Kimbrough. In this decision, the Court held that a district 
court does not abuse its discretion when it bases a below-
guideline sentence on disparities caused by the Sentencing Guide-
lines themselves.270 Specifically referring to the crack-to-cocaine 
disparity, the Court suggested that it may be possible for a defen-
dant to obtain a lower non-guideline sentence by arguing that a 
particular guideline sentence would create unwarranted dispari-
ties.271 However, it is yet to be determined whether a variance 
from the Sentencing Guidelines based solely on the judges view 
 265. Ellis & Feldman, Jr., supra note 263, at 47; see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 
___, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, ___, 128 S. Ct. 558 
(2007). 
266. Gall, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 595. 
 267. Id. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 596–97; see also Ellis & Feldman, Jr., supra note 263, at 
48. 
268. Gall, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 597; see also Ellis & Feldman, Jr., supra note 
263, at 48. 
 269. John D. Olive, Federal Sentencing Landscape Post-Gall, 31 WYO. LAW. 14, 14 
(2008). 
 270. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 575–76; see also Ellis & Feldman, Jr., 
supra note 263, at 48. 
271. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 575–76. 
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that the guidelines range “fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) con-
siderations” is acceptable to bypass appellate review.272 
The two cases of Gall and Kimbrough provide the next step in 
the fulfillment of the Judicial Branch’s reclaiming of sentencing 
power. Representing the new approach taken by the Roberts 
Court, it seems the consequences of Booker are becoming much 
more solidified. In both cases, the majority consisted of Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, 
and Breyer.273 The two dissenting Justices were Thomas and Ali-
to.274 Both cases represent the emerging consensus on the Court 
in interpreting Booker as a case that gives judges more discretion 
then they have had since pre-SRA days.275 Yet even with this in-
crease in discretion, the Court continues to emphasize the role of 
the Sentencing Guidelines as a default provision.276 With this dual 
approach, the Court has taken a solid centrist position which has 
ensured a solid majority. 
2. Public Statements and Positions of Judges
In addition to case law, individual judges have relied on public 
statements to fight back against the determinate sentencing sys-
tem. These public statements come in two forms—testimonial and 
promotional. The first type, testimonial, has been used in front of 
both Congress and the Sentencing Commission. Testimonial pub-
lic statements are delivered by judges either representing them-
selves or judicial organizations.277 The most vocal organization to 
 272. Ellis & Feldman, Jr., supra note 263, at 51 (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at ___, 
128 S. Ct. at 575, 577). 
273. Gall, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 591; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 
563.  
 274. Gall, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 591; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 
577–78. 
275. See Ellis & Feldman, Jr., supra note 263, at 51. 
 276. See Gall, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 594; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. 
at 574.  
277. See, e.g., Cracked Justice Hearing, supra note 241, at 17–30; Thomas F. Hogan, 
Chief Judge, United States Dist. Court for D.C., Prepared Testimony before the United 
States Sentencing Commission (Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/ 
02_15_05/Hogan-testimony.pdf (speaking as an individual U.S. District Court judge); 
Lawrence Piersol, Chief Judge, United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of S.D., Statement 
before the United States Sentencing Commission (Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www. 
ussc.gov/hearings/02_15_05/Piersol_testimony.pdf (speaking from his personal point of 
view). 
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use its testimonial statements to influence lawmakers has been 
the Judicial Conference of the United States (“Judicial Confe-
rence”). Organized as a centralized body which receives policy 
recommendations from subordinate committees, the Judicial Con-
ference serves as the main policymaker within the federal court 
system.278 Encouraging judges “to consult with Congress to im-
prove ‘the law, the legal system and the administration of justice,’ 
but to stay away from activities that might ‘undermine the public 
confidence in the integrity, impartiality, or independence of the 
judiciary,’” the Judicial Conference has proven itself as an in-
fluential judicial body.279 Yet on the issue of disparity in sentenc-
ing for crack and powder cocaine, the Judicial Conference voted 
“to oppose the existing difference between crack and powder co-
caine sentences and support[ed] the reduction of that differ-
ence.”280 This clear statement by the Judicial Conference proves 
that in some matters, impartiality takes a back seat to efforts at 
influencing Congress. 
One unique aspect of judicial testimony concerning sentencing 
reform is that the majority of testifying judges have attachments 
to judicial organizations. When testifying, judges routinely broad-
cast their affiliations with judicial organizations, whether ex-
pressing their own personal views or those of the organizations 
they represent.281 This group response by the judicial branch, even 
 278. See U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference, Organization and Operating Procedures, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf_organization.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). 
 279. Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch Relations, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1155, 1161 (2007) (citing JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CODE 
OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 12–18 (2002)). 
 280. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (2006). 
 281. See, e.g., Thomas F. Hogan, supra note 277 (“I speak today as an individual Unit-
ed States District Court judge and not on behalf of the Federal Judiciary, although I am a 
member of the Executive Committee to the Judicial Conference.”); Lawrence Piersol, supra 
note 277 (“I also serve as the President of the Federal Judges Association. . . . I would like 
to address you from now on from my personal point of view.”); Emmet G. Sullivan, Judge, 
United States Dist. Court for D.C., Statement on Behalf of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States Committee on Criminal Law Before the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion (Nov. 16, 2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/11_16_04/Sullivan.pdf (“I 
am a United States District Judge for the District of Columbia. I am also a member of the 
Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law and serve as the Chair of its Legislative 
Subcommittee.”); Reggie B. Walton, Testimony Presented to the United States Sentencing 
Commission on Sentencing Disparity for Crack and Powder Cocaine Offenses (Nov. 14, 
2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/11_15_06/JudgeWalton-testimony.pdf 
(“Thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States’ Criminal Law Committee. . . . What I indicate 
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in individualized lobbying, multiplies the power of their state-
ments. However, these testimonial efforts have had little effect on 
lawmakers.282 
Accompanying these testimonial statements are the various 
promotional attempts by the judiciary to voice its displeasure 
with the determinate system. One such promotional attempt in-
cludes participation in polls. In perhaps the most telling poll to 
date, federal judges were asked in 1996 “whether they agreed 
that Congress should allow judges greater discretion in sentenc-
ing.”283 The results showed that 81.5% of federal district judges 
and 79.7% of federal circuit judges agreed that judges deserve 
greater discretion in sentencing.284 Furthermore, 90% of federal 
judges surveyed were against mandatory minimum sentences for 
drug cases.285 
Along with polls, judicial leaders have made direct appeals to 
the public at large. Perhaps the most powerful criticism of Con-
gress from the Judicial Branch came from Justice Kennedy in his 
keynote address at the American Bar Association meeting in Au-
gust 2003.286 In this address, Justice Kennedy spoke in detail 
about the effects of over-incarceration, and concluded that “our 
resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sen-
tences too long.”287 Justice Kennedy also emphasized that “[t]he 
trial judge is the one actor in the system most experienced with 
exercising discretion in a transparent, open, and reasoned way.”288 
Coming from a Supreme Court Justice, statements such as these 
tend to garner the most press and have the greatest impact.289  
Unable to attract as much press, lower court judges have also 
begun to use their own courtrooms as a means to reach lawmak-
below are my personal views on the matter.”). 
 282. David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault 
on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 253 (2004). 
 283. Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Deci-
sions of Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231, 235 (2004). 
284. See id. 
285. Id. at 235 n.7. 
 286. Zlotnick, supra note 282, at 260 (citing Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at 
the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www. 
supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html. 
 287. Kennedy, supra note 286. 
288. Id. 
 289. Zlotnick, supra note 282, at 261–62. 
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ers and the public.290 These promotional statements are utilized 
by individual judges who state on the record that if they were 
given the discretion, they would have imposed a lesser sentence 
than required by the Guidelines or the mandatory minimum sta-
tute.291 Unable to reach a wide audience, lower court judges seem 
to hope that by blaming the other branches, the public will be en-
couraged to voice “their displeasure with Congress, the President, 
and in the voting booth.”292 
IV. LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS
As Part III revealed, the reformation of the United States drug 
sentencing system has been rife with struggle between competing 
players.293 With varying interests and motivations, these players 
have dramatically transformed the federal sentencing system into 
a political battlefield upon which institutional goals surpass pub-
lic objectives. As political actors have become confused in their 
own bureaucratic fog of war, concern for public safety has become 
a lost cause that few truly represent. Left with a system in which 
the executive is functionally inept, Congress is too politically 
frightened to take action, and the judiciary continuously attempts 
to complicate, the current sentencing laws have taken on a life-
less form gasping for breath. 
So what does this tell us? First and foremost, the first step in 
any attempt at resuscitation of the drug sentencing system must 
begin with a scholastic autopsy of the reformation process itself. 
As earlier described, the problem with the drug sentencing sys-
tem does not stem from a lack of ideas or normative conclusions. 
Instead, the system’s failures derive from the inability to main-
tain a unifying message (such as concern for public safety) be-
cause of a political process which encourages separation rather 
than synthesis.294  
Second, although every reformation movement encounters sim-
ilar flaws within the political process that take away from the 
overall success of the reform, the flaws brought forth here are 
290. See id. at 263. 
291. Id. 
292. See id. at 264. 
 293. See discussion supra Part III. 
 294. Id. 
912 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:867
magnified because of issues unique to drugs and sentencing. Due 
to the over-politicalization of the drug and sentencing issues, the 
multiplicity of the players involved, and the personalization of the 
motivations behind reform, the reform process has destroyed any 
coherent, unified message vital to the success of the sentencing 
system. By identifying these three problems, a diagnosis of the 
reform process can provide a reasonable basis for a set of success-
ful remedies. 
Third, among the lessons learned from such a destructive 
process, a few simple remedies could possibly refurbish a sentenc-
ing system badly needing reform. Although far from fixing every 
problem documented in the federal sentencing system, these pro-
posals attack the core structural issues perpetuating the evils of 
the reform process. Considering the governing power and judg-
ment power perspective of the sentencing reform struggle, these 
remedies supply portions of a vision which contain the capacity 
for success. With enough political courage, civic-minded leader-
ship, and tempered patience, these remedies could serve as a 
starting place to bring sentencing back to its clear origins. 
1. Over-Politicalization of the Issues
a. Identification of the Problem
In the beginning stages of the 1980s sentencing reform move-
ment, strong evidence supported the idea that change was needed 
for an outdated system.295 Although far from unanimous, powerful 
forces from across the political spectrum advocated and instituted 
a coherent bipartisan message in dealing with the federal sen-
tencing laws in the form of the SRA.296 But as the effects of the 
SRA and the Sentencing Guidelines played out, politics in abun-
dance infected Congress’s attitude toward the reforms. With the 
emergence of crime, in particular drug crimes, as a central politi-
cal issue throughout the 1980s, politicians facing reelection were 
forced to take action.297 Challenged by constituents, highlighted 
by constant media coverage, and offering the opportunity to gain 
a political advantage, the sentencing system became trapped in 
295. See, e.g., supra notes 12 and 13 and accompanying text. 
296. See Darmer, supra note 22, at 540. 
297. See Chanenson, supra note 27, at 557. 
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an escalating race between politicians.298 As penalties for offend-
ers increased and “tough on crime” platforms brought political 
success, the reform process began to grind away at the once unify-
ing message.299 Adding insult to injury, many of the same suppor-
ters who strongly endorsed the tough sentencing laws when the 
political winds were favorable began to flip sides when their local 
politics became too difficult to stand.300  
With drug penalties being shaped by an overreaction to public 
needs for tough crime legislation, further incidents of over-
politicalization of the sentencing issue developed. This time, how-
ever, politicalization came from opponents of the reform move-
ment.301 Consistent with all reform processes, a counter-
reformation effort sprang from congressional leaders and groups 
who saw political opportunity in opposing the new drug sentenc-
ing laws.302 Politicians representing minority districts, special in-
terest groups concerned with individualized experiences,303 aca-
demics providing critiques of the new system,304 and govern-
mental agencies tasked to study the issue,305 all contributed to 
this opposition. As sentencing reform became a tool for political 
advantage, public safety became a footnote in the sentencing de-
bate. 
Confronted with the political fears of being labeled soft on 
crime on one side and the oppositional forces revealing proble-
matic aspects of the sentencing system on the other, Congress 
balked. Desperately needing to supplement certain aspects, but 
not requiring a complete overhaul of the sentencing system, Con-
298. See Wilkins, Jr., et al., supra note 42, at 315. 
 299. See id. (noting Congress’s move away from simple reform toward bypassing the 
federal judiciary to prevent serious drug offenders from escaping lengthy prison terms).  
300. See Tonry, supra note 119, at 62–63 (discussing the “self-interests” of pro-reform 
legislators).  
301. See Devroy, supra note 119, at A1.  
 302. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Black Lawmakers Criticize Clinton Over Cocaine Sen-
tencing, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1997, at A15 (documenting the Congressional Black Caucus’s 
harsh criticism of the Clinton administration for not going far enough to convince Con-
gress to cut the disparity between crack and powdered cocaine).  
303. See, e.g., Families Against Mandatory Minimums, About FAMM, http://www. 
famm.org/AboutFAMM.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2009) (quoting FAMM’s mission state-
ment). 
304. See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 232. 
 305. See, e.g., McDonald & Carlson, supra note 167, at 225–26; see also 1995 COCAINE 
REPORT, supra note 53, at xiv–xv. 
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gress did what it does best—delegate.306 As a result of the reluc-
tance by Congress and the infectious reformation process, a defi-
cient status quo developed in the sentencing debate which al-
lowed the system to stall and further delay progressional needs. 
b. Remedy
The clear lesson concerning the over-politicalization of sentenc-
ing stems from a system placing governing power into the hands 
of a legislative branch which answers to both the general and lo-
cal public will. Accepting politics as standard procedure for all 
forms of legislation, reformers should recognize that over-
politicalization, not politics, is the problem. If congressional over-
politicalization inhibits needed reform or encourages overzealous 
amendment, steps should be built into the system to reign in 
purely political influence. One obvious starting place is the re-
sponsibility for sentencing reform. Congress should either take 
full responsibility for sentencing issues themselves or grant the 
Sentencing Commission the independence to act as a confident 
and secure body. By using the Sentencing Commission as a shield 
to institute reform while meddling in its internal affairs, Con-
gress is fooling no one. In this case, it appears the best cure for 
over-politicalization is transparency and debate conducted in an 
independent forum, free of political pollution. 
2. Multiple Assailants
a. Identification of the Problem
The next lesson from the sentencing reform process deals with 
the assortment of players involved in the issue. In a political sys-
tem that encourages free debate and open challenges, a wide va-
riety of influential actors have contributed to the current state of 
the sentencing system. With multiple governmental branches 
possessing varying amounts of governing power, no single branch 
was left with the authority or responsibility to fix problems with-
in the system. As each branch enters the mix and wields their 
 306. This cautionary approach is apparent in Congress’s calls for further Sentencing 
Commission studies, inaction on Sentencing Commission proposals, and failure to address 
problems volleyed by the Supreme Court.  
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particular powers, the internal governmental actors have ma-
naged to neutralize each others’ efforts. Leaving no one to lead 
and no one to blame, these actors have made it impossible for any 
true reform to take place.  
Accompanying the traditional governmental actors, who are 
decreasingly in possession of the greatest positions of power, out-
side forces have also entered the political fray. With multi-
pronged attacks lobbying Congress, the Sentencing Commission, 
the executive branch, the judiciary, and the public, relatively 
weak groups have obtained a pulpit for themselves. In champion-
ing specific causes, such as mandatory minimum sentences or the 
crack disparity issue, minor organizations have come to dominate 
the external reform process. With each group narrowing its focus 
to different flaws in the system, defenders are left to face attacks 
from all fronts. Because of this overwhelming opposition against 
the system, it is likely that the enduring strengths in the current 
system will be overlooked. 
b. Remedy
Without limiting the number of players involved in reform, it 
appears that the only successful strategy to thwart the multiple 
assailant phenomenon is to restore the government as the prin-
cipal actor in sentencing. To do so, clear boundaries must be es-
tablished by all three branches. In terms of judgment power, the 
bodies least vulnerable to public attack, such as the judiciary and 
executive, should become the central figures. Likewise, a truly 
independent body insulated from political pressure could take the 
lead in advising Congress on issues relating to the overall frame-
work of the sentencing system. Thus, instead of the struggle over 
governing power taking place within the halls of Congress, bat-
tles should be fought at a lower level before a non-political body 
based on fact and debate. With special interest groups forced to 
provide real arguments rather than political threats, this inde-
pendent body can refocus the importance of sentencing in terms 
of public safety rather than political power. In doing so, the 
reform process can be streamlined into a coherent course of action 
rather than a political free-for-all.  
At the conclusion of careful and through investigation, Con-
gress can then use its governing power to either accept or modify 
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the independent body’s suggestions. Although subject to political 
influences at this decision-making stage, any ill-reasoned devia-
tion by Congress from the independent body’s recommendation 
will be judged by the public. Similar to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, this new independent body could hold re-
sponsibility for studying, devising, and enforcing the sentencing 
laws of the United States government.307 If given enough inde-
pendence and legitimacy, unlike the current Sentencing Commis-
sion, this body’s recommendation could create a governing 
framework in which reasoned conclusions will balance political 
objectives.  
3. Personalization of Reform
a. Identification of the Problem
The last lesson of the reform process examines the personaliza-
tion of the motivations behind the sentencing laws. Stemming 
from the over-politicalization of the sentencing issue, non-elected 
actors saw opportunities to influence the process. Divided into 
governmental and non-governmental actors, these unelected 
groups have come close to overstepping their proper roles to fur-
ther personal agendas. 
Inside the government, the Supreme Court used the instru-
ment of judicial review in cases such as Booker, Kimbrough, and 
Gall to gain back some of the power it had originally lost.308 
Representing the top of the judiciary both in the finality of their 
legal decisions and in political infighting, the Supreme Court 
stood embarrassingly silent during the implementation of a de-
terminate sentencing system.309 Facing widespread pressure from 
 307. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC 
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http:// 
www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). 
 308. See Ellis & Feldman, Jr., supra note 263, at 50 (discussing the effects of Kim-
brough in protecting lower courts that deviate from the Sentencing Guidelines due to in-
stances  involving  the  problematic  crack  disparity  issue);  Olive,  supra  note  269, at 14 
(highlighting the effects of Gall in insulating lower court guideline departures from appel-
late review); Tracey & Fiorelli, supra note 251, at 1226 (highlighting the Supreme Court’s 
changing of the Sentencing Guidelines from mandatory to advisory).  
 309. This loss of judicial power in sentencing is exemplified by the mandatory nature of 
the Sentencing Guidelines, the Feeney Amendment, and the harsh mandatory minimums 
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. The court waited twenty-one years from the imple-
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lower court judges,310 the Supreme Court was forced to take action 
to legitimize itself as the leader of the judiciary. Unfortunately for 
the integrity of the political process, the Court, as seen in Booker, 
was forced to take on the role of policy maker in order to gain 
back lost power.311 This violation is further evidence of the per-
sonal incentives inherent in a faulty politicized reformation 
process. 
Another governmental actor seeing an opportunity to gain a 
personal advantage was the Sentencing Commission. Created as 
subservient to Congress, the Sentencing Commission waited sev-
eral years to establish itself as a credible body before beginning 
their own criticisms of the sentencing model.312 As an agency dom-
inated by judges,313 the Sentencing Commission is similar to the 
Supreme Court in that it too had personal problems with a de-
terminate sentencing system.314 Overriding these judicial goals, 
however, has been the Sentencing Commission’s need to safe-
guard its own survival. By making the tactical decision to limit 
their criticisms to politically correct subjects, the Sentencing 
Commission has managed to endure despite becoming a largely 
ineffective body.315  
Perhaps the strongest examples of entities placing individual 
interests before the public good are the special interest groups. 
Made to specifically address limited personal objectives, these 
groups have fractured the original reform message into compo-
nent parts. By reframing reform into a movement about the indi-
vidual, rather than the community, special interest groups have 
allowed a vocal minority to speak for the “people.” Given greater 
mentation of the SRA to Booker. 
 310. See Boylan, supra note 283, at 235 (revealing poll numbers which show unhappi-
ness of the judiciary with the determinate sentencing system). 
 311. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 272 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court’s decision to [invalidate the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines] 
represents a policy choice that Congress has considered and decisively rejected. While it is 
perfectly clear that Congress has ample power to repeal these two statutory provisions if it 
so desires, this Court should not make that choice on Congress’s [sic] behalf.”). 
312. See Chanenson, supra note 27, at 559. 
313. See Former Commissioners, supra note 197.  
314. See Barkow, supra note 182, at 759 (highlighting how a Sentencing Commission 
consisting of judges would have problems stripping away more judicial discretion). 
 315. The Sentencing Commission has continually advocated for reform within the Sen-
tencing Guidelines system. Their criticisms have largely been toward mandatory mini-
mum sentences and the crack disparity problem. Both issues take away from congression-
al determinate power and give discretion back to the courts. 
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access to power brokers because of specialization and tenacious 
advocacy, the special interest groups have elbowed their way into 
the political debate. Achieving little actual reform, the greatest 
effect of these groups has been their corruption of the process it-
self. 
b. Remedy
Coupled with the remedies suggested earlier, the personaliza-
tion of reform is best cured by a fair apportionment of power. 
Falling back upon the separation of powers scheme well known in 
our republican form of government, judgment power in sentenc-
ing should be divided between the executive and judicial 
branches. Done so only after responsible study and cooperative 
compromise prescribed by Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
Branches should be required to only use their sentencing powers 
as apportioned. Any deviation by either branch would then cause 
the independent body to petition Congress for sanctions in the 
form of a weakening of assigned judgment powers. Thus, with 
judgment power clearly and fairly divided between branches, well 
defined sanctions to combat political overreaching, and a provi-
sion supplying a supreme arbiter in Congress, judgment power 
issues will remain free from personalized power seeking. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The powers behind sentencing reform have engaged in a twen-
ty-five year struggle to alter the federal drug sentencing laws. In-
itially successful in maintaining a coherent unified message, a 
variety of processional forces and self-serving actors have dis-
torted the focus on public safety. By reviewing the schizophrenic 
history of reform, examining the motivations of influential play-
ers, and studying the reform process itself, a complex web of pow-
er provides an explanation for the paralysis of the current move-
ment. Until the previous message or a rational substitute takes 
its place, further stagnation is on the horizon. Regardless of what 
remedies are offered, leaders must first overcome the excess of 
politics, limit reform to the proper authorities, and fairly divide 
power before any necessary reform will ever surface. 
